Electoral Evidence by Nicolas, Peter
University of Washington School of Law
UW Law Digital Commons
Articles Faculty Publications
2017
Electoral Evidence
Peter Nicolas
University of Washington School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Election Law Commons, and the Evidence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles by an authorized administrator of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter Nicolas, Electoral Evidence, 69 Ala. L. Rev. 109 (2017), https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles/280
ELECTORAL EVIDENCE
Peter Nicolas*
A B STRA C T .................................................................................................. 110
IN TRO DU CTION .......................................................................................... 110
I. ELECTORAL EVIDENCE: DEFINITION AND RELEVANCE ......................... 115
A. Overview of Voting Methods in the United States ................... 116
B. The Definition of Electoral Evidence ...................................... 118
C. The Relevance of Electoral Evidence ...................................... 121
1. Substantive Relevance in Election Contests ...................... 122
2. Substantive Relevance in Other Types of Cases ................ 127
3. Relevance for Impeachment Purposes ............................... 130
II. THE DANGERS OF ELECTORAL EVIDENCE ............................................ 133
A. The Trustworthiness of Electoral Evidence ............................. 134
B. The Interest in Ballot Secrecy .................................................. 138
C. The Misuse of Electoral Evidence ........................................... 140
III. ELECTORAL EVIDENCE AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ....................... 141
A. State "Political Vote" Privileges ............................................ 142
B. Other Evidentiary Bases for Excluding Electoral Evidence .... 150
1. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination ................................. 150
2. The Rule Against Hearsay ................................................. 152
3. The "Best Evidence" Rule ................................................. 156
4. U nfair P rejudice ................................................................ 159
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM .................................................................. 160
C ON CLU SION .............................................................................................. 167
* William L. Dwyer Endowed Chair in Law and Adjunct Professor of Gender, Women, &
Sexuality Studies, University of Washington. I wish to thank Judy Davis, Erica Koscher, Sherry
Leysen, and Ingrid Mattson for their valuable research assistance, and Helen A. Anderson, Steve
Calandrillo, Mary D. Fan, Maureen A. Howard, Edward J. Imwinkelried, Laird Kirkpatrick, Anita
Krug, Lisa M. Manheim, and Jessica West for their valuable feedback.
Alabama Law Review
ABSTRACT
Each year, millions of Americans cast votes for specific candidates or
on specific ballot measures. Each such vote generates potential "electoral
evidence," the admissibility of which may be the subject of dispute in
subsequent litigation. The evidence may take various forms, including the
marked ballot itself, a voter's testimony regarding her vote, or her written
or oral statements regarding her vote.
Electoral evidence is most commonly offered in litigation over the
election outcome itself, with the parties seeking to determine how certain
individuals voted to resolve a close election. However, its potential
relevance is not limited to such proceedings. It may also be substantively
relevant in a case in which the voter is alleged to have discriminated
against someone, or to prove potential juror or witness bias against a
party. While election contests for specific candidates only provide insight
into a voter's general political leanings that is only marginally relevant to
prove discriminatory purpose or bias in most instances, votes cast in recent
years on gay and transgender rights, affirmative action, religious freedom,
tort reform, and abortion provide insight into a voter's views about
discrete categories ofpersons that is far more probative of such matters.
The admissibility of electoral evidence has been given piecemeal
consideration in judicial opinions, but has not received comprehensive
attention in any judicial opinion or in the scholarly literature. This Article
is the first comprehensive examination of the evidentiary issues that arise
when a party seeks to offer electoral evidence in judicial proceedings. It
identifies three dangers associated with admitting electoral evidence: its
trustworthiness; the individual and societal interests in protecting ballot
secrecy; and the risk of unfair prejudice. It demonstrates that these dangers
are addressed in a fragmentary and incomplete fashion by existing
evidentiary rules. Relying on social science research about the veracity of
voters in recounting their votes as well as the history behind the
development of the right to ballot secrecy, this Article concludes that courts
and policy makers should be cautious about deeming electoral evidence
admissible and should allow it only in limited circumstances.
INTRODUCTION
Although nationwide elections for President occur only once every four
years, voters go to the polls multiple times each year in the United States to
elect over half a million other federal, state, and local officials1 as well as to
1. See JENNIFER L. LAWLESS, BECOMING A CANDIDATE: POLITICAL AMBITION AND THE
DECISION TO RUN FOR OFFICE 33 (2012).
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cast votes on numerous ballot measures. Each time a person votes--or
attempts to vote-in an election, she generates potential "electoral
evidence," the admissibility of which may be the subject of dispute when
offered in subsequent judicial proceedings. Such evidence can take various
forms, including the marked ballot itself,2 the voter's own testimony of
how she voted (or intended to vote) in the election,3 the voter's written or
oral statements to others regarding her actual or intended vote,4 the
testimony of a third person who observed the voter marking her ballot, 5 a
ballot "selfie" posted by the voter on social media,6 or other circumstantial
evidence of how the person voted.7
Typically, such evidence has been offered in litigation involving a
contest over the outcome of the very election that generated the electoral
evidence. Most frequently, such litigation involves a close election contest
coupled with an allegation that some individuals-sufficient in number to
impact the election result-unlawfully voted in the election, with the
parties seeking to prove the tenor of the votes cast unlawfully in an effort to
determine the outcome of the election. 8 For example, the candidates in the
1977 mayoral election in Ann Arbor, Michigan were separated by a single
vote, and the losing candidate sought to compel seventeen individuals who
voted in the election but who did not actually reside in the city to disclose
how they voted. 9 Similarly, in the 2004 gubernatorial election in
Washington, the margin of victory was only 129 votes, and there was
evidence that nearly 1,400 convicted felons who had been stripped of their
voting rights had illegally participated in the election.
10
Alternatively, electoral evidence may be offered in election contests in
which some of the ballots have been lost, stolen, destroyed,11 or tampered
with;12 votes have been improperly recorded (such as where a voting
machine malfunctions); 13 or when necessary to interpret an ambiguously
2. See, e.g., Pennington v. Hare, 62 N.W. 116, 117 (Minn. 1895).
3. See, e.g., Doss v. Chambers, 188 S.W. 260, 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
4. See, e.g., Lauer v. Estes, 53 P. 262, 263 (Cal. 1898).
5. See, e.g., People ex rel. Williams v. Cicott, 16 Mich. 283, 313 (1868) (opinion of Christiancy,
J.), overruled in part by Petrie v. Curtis, 196 N.W.2d 761 (Mich. 1972).
6. See generally Rideout v. Gardner, 838 F.3d 65, 67 (1 st Cir. 2016).
7. See, e.g., Moore v. Sharp, 41 S.W. 587, 590 (Tenn. 1897), overruled by Brown v. Hows, 40
S.W.2d 1017 (Tenn. 1931).
8. See, e.g., Belcher v. Mayor of Ann Arbor, 261 N.W.2d 56, 57 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
9. See id.
10. See In re Coday, 130 P.3d 809, 810-12 (Wash. 2006) (en banc); Gregory Roberts, Judge
Upholds Gregoire's Election; Rossi Won't Appeal, SEATILE POST-INTELLIGENCER REPORTER (June 5,
2005, 10:00 PM) http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Judge-upholds-Gregoire-s-election-Rossi-won-
t-1 175262.php.
11. See, e.g., Dixon v. Orr, 4 S.W. 774, 776 (Ark. 1887).
12. See, e.g., Wilburn v. Galloway, 179 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
13. See, e.g., Helm v. State Election Bd., 589 P.2d 224, 226-27 (Okla. 1979).
2017]
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marked ballot. 4 Finally, electoral evidence may be offered in a case in
which some individuals were wrongfully prevented from voting in the
election. 5
However, the relevance of electoral evidence is not limited solely to
cases involving contests over the election results themselves. Rather, such
evidence is potentially relevant in proceedings wholly unrelated to
resolving election disputes. This is both because an individual's general
voting record and her votes cast on discrete ballot initiatives reveal
valuable information about her, and because the rules of evidence broadly
define relevance to include anything that has even slight probative value.'
6
Substantively, electoral evidence is most clearly relevant in a case
alleging discrimination on the basis of political affiliation.1 7 For example,
evidence that a supervisor always-or nearly always-voted for
Democratic candidates would be relevant in an employment discrimination
case in which the supervisor is accused of unlawfully firing someone
because of the employee's visible political support of Republican
candidates. Electoral evidence would also be relevant-albeit with far less
probative force-in cases involving discrimination on some basis other
than political affiliation. For example, an employee who alleges that she
was fired from her job because she is transgender might contend that her
supervisor's consistent votes in favor of Republican candidates-who tend
overwhelmingly to oppose transgender rights' 8-is relevant in determining
whether the supervisor acted with discriminatory intent.
Electoral evidence is also probative and thus potentially admissible for
the purpose of revealing potential juror or witness bias against a party. For
example, if a party in a politically charged case is a high-profile figure
associated with a political party, evidence of potential jurors' political
leanings is relevant in assessing whether they can be impartial.' 9 Similarly,
if a party to an action is associated with a political party, evidence of the
political leanings of a witness who testifies at the trial can be highly
probative in assessing her potential bias for or against that party.20 Indeed,
in the modem, highly partisan political environment, the relevance of such
evidence to prove bias seems particularly acute.
14. See, e.g., Davis v. State ex rel. Wren, 12 S.W. 957, 960 (Tex. 1889).
15. See, e.g., Rubens v. Hodges, 837 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Ark. 1992).
16. See FED. R. EvID. 401; United States v. Holmes, 413 F.3d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 2005).
17. See, e.g., Vinci v. Quagliani, 889 F. Supp. 2d 348, 348 (D. Conn. 2012); D'Aurizio v.
Borough of Palisades Park, 899 F. Supp. 1352, 1353 (D.N.J. 1995).
18. See Daniel Cox & Robert P. Jones, Majority of Americans Oppose Transgender Bathroom
Restrictions, PUBLIC RELIGION RESEARCH INSTITUTE (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://www.prri.org/researchllgbt-transgender-bathroom-discrimination-religious-liberty/.
19, See, e.g., Wagner v. Jones, 928 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1101-03 n.20 (S.D. Iowa 2013).
20. See, e.g., Henderson v. Dreyfus, 191 P. 442, 453 (N.M. 1919).
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Yet, for a number of reasons, the relevance of electoral evidence
outside of contests regarding the election results themselves has received
scant attention in judicial opinions or in the academic literature. First,
although evidence of a person's general political leanings is highly relevant
in a case in which the person is accused of political affiliation
discrimination, causes of action for such discrimination are relatively rare
21
and limited in scope.22 Second, although such evidence can be highly
probative in determining juror or witness bias in cases in which a party and
a juror or witness have strongly opposing or matching political leanings,
the number of scenarios in which a party's political affiliations are likely to
be known to potential jurors or witnesses so as to raise bias concerns are
likely few and far between. Third, because the probative link between a
person's general political preferences and her willingness to discriminate
against a person for a more targeted reason-such as due to her sexual
orientation, gender identity, religion, or other characteristic-is a tenuous
one, parties are unlikely to offer and courts are unlikely to admit such
evidence under those circumstances.
However, while the votes cast by an individual in traditional election
contests for specific candidates only provide insight into her general
political leanings that may be of marginal relevance in most cases, her
votes cast in discrete election contests in recent decades involving such hot-
button issues as gay23 and transgender rights,24 race-based affirmative
action, religious freedom,26 tort reform,27 and abortion rights28 provide
21. See, e.g., Rare "Political Activity Discrimination" Lawsuit Sent to Trial, 13 No. 21 CAL.
EMP. L. LETTER 9 (2004).
22. In most jurisdictions, the cause of action is available only against public employers, not
private ones. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 18A.140 (2010). Only a handful of states prohibit private
discrimination on the basis of political affiliation. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (1937); D.C. CODE
§ 32-408 (2008); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 146.
23. See, e.g., California Proposition 8, the "Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry"
Initiative (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, https:/fballotpedia.org/CalifomiaProposition_8,_the_%22
EliminatesRight of Same-SexCouples toMarry%22_Initiative_(2008) (last visited Sept. 17, 2017)
(amending California constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage).
24. See, e.g., City of Houston Anti-Discrimination HERO Veto Referendum (November 2015),
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/City of HoustonAnti-DiscriminationHEROVeto_
Referendum,_Propositionl_(November_2015) (last visited Sept. 17, 2017) (veto referendum targeting
ordinance prohibiting sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination).
25. See, e.g., Michigan Civil Rights Amendment, Proposal 2 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/MichiganCivilRightsAmendment, Proposal_2_(2006) (last visited Oct. 1,
2016) (amending Michigan constitution to prohibit race-based preferences in public university
admissions).
26. See, e.g., Oklahoma Public Money for Religious Purposes, State Question 790 (2016),
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/OklahomaPublicMoneyforReligiousPurposes,_State_
Question_790_(2016) (last visited Sept. 17, 2017) (defeated proposal that would have amended
Oklahoma constitution to permit government to use public resources for the benefit of religion or
religious institutions).
27. See, e.g., Texas Limit on Damages In Medical Lawsuits, Proposition 12 (2003),
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/TexasLimit-onDamages-inMedicalLawsuits,_
2017]
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insight into a voter's views about discrete categories of persons that may be
of greater relevance and that are likely to garner judicial attention in the
near future.
Although electoral evidence can be relevant and thus potentially
admissible in both election contests and in other types of judicial
proceedings, it nonetheless raises three concerns that should give courts
and policy makers alike pause in deeming it admissible. First, electoral
evidence-particularly when it comes in the form of testimony by the voter
herself or evidence of her out-of-court oral or written statements regarding
the tenor of her vote-is of dubious trustworthiness.2 9 Particularly when
her vote in favor of a particular candidate or ballot initiative is out-of-step
with the politics of her social and work circles, a desire not to be treated as
an outcast may impel her to inaccurately recount her vote.30 Second,
admitting electoral evidence undermines the right to ballot secrecy, which
furthers not only voters' individual interests31 but also societal interests in
preventing vote buying, voter intimidation, and other historical practices
that led to the enactment of laws ensuring a right to vote by secret ballot.
32
Finally, although electoral evidence is relevant and thus potentially
admissible in a wide swath of cases, in many such cases there is a
significant risk that the evidence may be overvalued or misused by the trier
of fact.
These three risks associated with admitting electoral evidence are
addressed by the rules of evidence, but in a fragmentary and incomplete
fashion. The most significant evidentiary obstacles are two different types
of privileges, both of which are at least partially grounded in constitutional
guarantees: the political vote privilege, which protects against disclosure of
lawfully cast votes, 33 and the privilege against self-incrimination, which
protects against disclosure of unlawfully cast votes.34 Other evidentiary
Proposition 12_(September 2003) (last visited Sept. 17, 2017) (amending Texas constitution to
authorize legislature to limit damages in certain types of tort actions).
28. See, e.g., Mississippi Life Begins at the Moment of Fertilization Amendment, Initiative 26
(2011), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/MississippiLifeBegins_at the Moment-of
FertilizationAmendment, Initiative 26_(2011) (last visited Sept. 17, 2017) (defeated initiative to
amend Mississippi constitution to define life as beginning at the moment of fertilization).
29. See, e.g., Lauer v. Estes, 53 P. 262, 263 (Cal. 1898); Pennington v. Hare, 62 N.W. 116, 117
(Minn. 1895); In re Harper, 456 S.E.2d 878, 881 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
30. See, e.g., Smith v. Thomas, 54 P. 71, 72 (Cal. 1898); Richard J. Powell, Social Desirability
Bias in Polling on Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Measures, 41 AM. POL. RES. 1052, 1054-56 (2013).
31. See proposed FED. R. EvID. 507 advisory committee's note; CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5:50 (4th ed. 2017).
32. See D'Aurizio v. Borough of Palisades Park, 899 F. Supp. 1352, 1358-59 (D.N.J. 1995);
McCavitt v. Registrars of Voters, 434 N.E.2d 620, 631 (Mass. 1982); In re Orsatti, 598 A.2d 1341,
1343-44 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
33. See, e.g., ALA. R. EVID. 506; Taylor v. Pile, 391 P.2d 670, 673 (Colo. 1964).
34. See, e.g., Montoya v. Ortiz, 175 P. 335, 337-38 (N.M. 1918); Oliphint v. Christy, 299
S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tex. 1957).
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bases for excluding electoral evidence include the rule against hearsay,35
the best evidence rule,36 and unfair prejudice.37 Yet despite all of these
potential evidentiary roadblocks, some electoral evidence is still potentially
admissible under current law.
Although electoral evidence raises important evidentiary and
constitutional issues, its admissibility has received only limited, piecemeal
attention in judicial opinions and virtually none in the scholarly literature.
This Article is thus the first comprehensive examination of the
admissibility of electoral evidence. Part I of this Article defines the phrase
"electoral evidence" and identifies in detail the various ways in which it is
potentially relevant under the Federal Rules of Evidence and their state law
counterparts. Part II identifies three major risks associated with admitting
electoral evidence: its trustworthiness, its negative impact on the individual
and societal interests in protecting ballot secrecy, and its danger of unfairly
prejudicing judicial proceedings. Part III demonstrates that existing
evidentiary principles-including privilege, hearsay, the best evidence rule,
and exclusion on the ground of unfair prejudice-address these concerns,
but in a fragmentary and incomplete fashion. Part IV contends that existing
evidentiary principles thus fail adequately to protect both the integrity of
judicial proceedings and the interest in ballot secrecy by allowing for the
admission of electoral evidence and proposes reform that addresses these
concerns in a comprehensive fashion. This Article concludes that electoral
evidence is relevant and thus potentially admissible in numerous scenarios,
many of which are as yet unrecognized in judicial opinions. However,
relying on traditional evidentiary principles reinforced by social science
research about the veracity of voters in recounting their votes, as well as
the history behind the development of the right to ballot secrecy, this
Article concludes that courts and policy makers should be cautious about
deeming electoral evidence admissible and should allow it only in limited
circumstances.
I. ELECTORAL EVIDENCE: DEFINITION AND RELEVANCE
To assess the risks associated with admitting electoral evidence and the
doctrinal and policy-related rationales for its exclusion from judicial
proceedings, it is important to identify the potential scope of the problem
this Article seeks to resolve. Accordingly, Part L.A provides a brief
overview of the various methods of voting in the United States today. That
35. See FED. R. EVID. 802; Lauer v. Estes, 53 P. 262, 263 (Cal. 1898); City of Beardstown v.
City of Virginia, 76 111. 34, 47 (1875).
36. See FED. R. EVID. 1002; Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 607-08 (Ill. 1990); Helm v.
State Election Bd., 589 P.2d 224, 234 (Okla. 1979).
37. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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overview provides the backdrop for defining the phrase "electoral
evidence." Part I.B next delineates with precision the various methods by
which a litigant can seek to directly or indirectly prove the tenor of
someone's vote. Finally, Part I.C identifies the myriad ways in which such
evidence is potentially relevant both for substantive and impeachment
purposes.
A. Overview of Voting Methods in the United States
To fully understand the range of possible forms of electoral evidence-
as well as some of the rationales that might justify its exclusion-it is
important to understand how voting methods have evolved in the United
States. From the inception of our nation until the late nineteenth century,
the exclusive method of voting in the United States was by way of paper
ballots that were marked and counted by hand38 in elections that were not
conducted by secret ballot.39 States did not initially regulate the form of the
ballot, leading advocates for competing political parties and groups to
create preprinted ballots listing the names of their preferred candidates.40
Often, these ballots were printed on brightly colored paper or contained
other distinctive marks that could be recognized from a distance. 41 This
state of affairs led to rampant instances of vote buying and voter coercion.42
Because the preprinted ballots were recognizable from a distance, a person
seeking to bribe someone to vote a given way could monitor and confirm
that the voter carried through with the promised act.43 For similar reasons,
employers in favor of a particular candidate or ballot initiative could
pressure their employees to vote in a particular way by watching them cast
their ballots. 44 A person approaching the ballot box with a distinctly
identified ballot could likewise be physically blocked or harassed by
supporters of the opposing candidate or party.45
These instances of vote buying and coercion led states to adopt the so-
called Australian ballot.46 Under the Australian ballot system, voters mark
38. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1718 (2005).
39. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 224 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). This state of affairs was
inherited from England, which did not introduce the secret ballot until 1872. See Burson v. Freeman,
504 U.S. 191, 202 (1992).
40. See Reed, 561 U.S. at 226; Burson, 504 U.S. at 200; Metheny v. Pickel, 141 N.E. 762, 764
(fl1. 1923); Tokaji, supra note 38, at 1718.
41. See Reed, 561 U.S. at 226; Burson, 504 U.S. at 200.
42. See Reed, 561 U.S. at 226-27; Tokaji, supra note 38, at 1718.
43. See Reed, 561 U.S. at 226-27; Burson, 504 U.S. at 200-01.
44. See Reed, 561 U.S. at 226.
45. See id at 226-27.
46. See id.; Burson, 504 U.S. at 203--04.
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their choices in secret on an official, uniform ballot printed by the
government at public expense that lists all the candidates and ballot
proposals and that is distributed only at the polling place itself.47 That
system, developed in Australia in 1856,48 was first adopted in the United
States in 1888,4 9 and by 1896 it was adopted by almost ninety percent of
the states. 50 Although most jurisdictions that adopted the Australian ballot
made the vote truly secret by making it impossible for even election
officials to trace a ballot to a particular individual,51 there were exceptions.
For a period of time, some states required that the official ballots be
individually numbered so that, in the event of an election contest involving
a dispute over the right of certain people to vote in the election, their
individual ballots could be identified and invalidated.52
Over time, hand-counted paper ballots have been eclipsed by four other
methods of voting, and today fewer than two percent of votes are cast in
this fashion.53 Concerns over tampering with paper ballots as well as
difficulties with interpreting voter intent led to the invention in 1892 of
mechanical-lever voting machines.54 However, voting machines, while not
easily tampered with, began to malfunction with increased frequency as the
machines aged, and the absence of a paper record made it impossible to
reconstruct the election in the event of a malfunction. 55 In 1964, punch-card
ballots were introduced, which require voters to use a stylus to punch
through perforations in the card corresponding to particular candidates and
ballot choices.56 These have the advantage over paper ballots of increased
accuracy in counting votes because they are machine rather than hand-
counted, and they have an advantage over mechanical-lever voting
machines in that there is a paper trail, but they come with the risk that the
voter's intent will not be accurately reflected-as evidenced in the 2000
U.S. presidential election-if the chads57 are not fully removed or if they
47. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 202; Tokaji, supra note 38, at 1718-19.
48. See Tokaji, supra note 38, at 1718.
49. See Reed, 561 U.S. at 227; Burson, 504 U.S. at 203; Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241,
249 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
50. See Reed, 561 U.S. at 227; Burson, 504 U.S. at 204-05.
51. See, e.g., McGrane v. County ofNez Perce, 112 P. 312, 314 (Idaho 1910); Williams v. Stein,
38 Ind. 89, 95-96 (1871); Brisbin v. Cleary, I N.W. 825, 826 (Minn. 1879).
52. See Willis v. Crumbly, 268 S.W.3d 288, 294-97 (Ark. 2007); Womack v. Foster, 8 S.W.3d
854, 864-68 (Ark. 2000); Exparte Oppenstein, 233 S.W. 440, 443 (Mo. 1921).
53. See Tokaji, supra note 38, at 1719.
54. See id; Trenton I. Weaver, E-Nie, Me-Nie, Mi-Ne-Vote: How to Encourage Internet Voting
Innovation, 12 US: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 327, 332 (2016).
55. See Tokaji, supra note 38, at 1719; Weaver, supra note 54, at 332-33.
56. See Tokaji, supra note 38, at 1719-20; Weaver, supra note 54, at 333.
57. Chads are the perforated parts of the ballot that the voter is supposed to punch through to
mark her choice. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000).
20171
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are punched in the wrong place due to misalignment.58 In the 1980s, states
began to use optical-scan ballots, by which voters mark their preferences
by filling in an oval or otherwise marking a paper ballot that is machine-
counted.59 These have the same advantages as punch-card ballots, along
with the additional advantage that some jurisdictions allow voters to use a
machine to check their ballots before putting them in the ballot box to
ensure that no stray marks or accidents have resulted in an under- or over-
vote for any office or ballot question. 60 Finally, starting in the 1970s, some
jurisdictions introduced direct record electronic voting machines (DREs),
whereby voters use a touch screen or something similar to indicate their
votes, and their votes are recorded electronically. 61 This method is a
modem version of the mechanical-lever voting machine and generally
shares its lack of a paper record, which is a disadvantage in the event of a
machine malfunction. 62 However, some DREs are designed to create a
voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT), meaning that they print out a
paper record that the voter can review to confirm that her vote has been
correctly recorded, with the paper record being saved by election officials
in the event that the machine malfunctions or there is otherwise a need to
examine individually cast ballots.63
B. The Definition of Electoral Evidence
The first and perhaps most obvious type of electoral evidence is the
marked ballot itself. Imagine that there is a very close election contest that
turns on an interpretation of the intent of a handful of voters. In
jurisdictions that use any form of paper-based voting-including hand-
counted paper ballots, punch-card ballots, and optical-scan ballots-a paper
record of the ballot exists for each cast vote, and thus the trier of fact can
examine the marked or punched paper ballots themselves to determine
voter intent. 64 In a jurisdiction that uses DREs to record votes, the
electronic record of each individual voter's virtual ballot is stored in the
58. See Tokaji, supra note 38, at 1720-21; Weaver, supra note 54, at 333.
59. See Tokaji, supra note 38, at 1721-22; Weaver, supra note 54, at 333-34.
60. See Tokaji, supra note 38, at 1721-22; Weaver, supra note 54, at 334.
61. See Tokaji, supra note 38, at 1722; Weaver, supra note 54, at 334-35.
62. See Tokaji, supra note 38, at 1724.
63. See Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nev. Sec'y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 732 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012);
Joshua F. Clowers, I E-Vote, U I-Vote, Why Can't We All Just Vote?!: A Survey of the Changing Face
of the American Election, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 61, 70 (2006).
64. See, e.g., McCavitt v. Registrars of Voters, 434 N.E.2d 620, 623-25 (Mass. 1982) (punch-
card ballot); Pennington v. Hare, 62 N.W. 116, 117 (Minn. 1895) (hand-counted paper ballot); Spaeth v.
Kendall, 801 P.2d 591, 592-93 (Mont. 1990) (optical-scan ballot).
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machine and thus serves as an analogue to the ballot itself,65 and those
electronic records can be individually printed after the election in the event
of a dispute.66 In those DRE jurisdictions that use VVPAT, the printout
serves as a duplicate copy of the virtual ballot in paper form that can be
examined in the event of a dispute over the outcome of the election.67
Mechanical-lever voting machines create no such individual records, and
there is thus no analogue to the "ballot itself' in such jurisdictions.68
Although the "ballot itself' may typically be characterized as the "best"
or most superior method of proving how someone voted,69 for two different
reasons, such evidence is not always available. First, for elections in which
mechanical-lever voting machines are used, there is no record of
individually cast votes and thus nothing analogous to the "ballot itself.,70
Second, even if individually marked ballots exist in paper form or can be
recreated from electronic data, they may be of no utility if-as is typically
the case-there is no way to connect the ballots to specific individuals.7t
Thus, for example, if what is at issue in the recount is not the decryption of
an ambiguously marked ballot but instead the voiding of the votes of
individuals who illegally participated in the election, examination of the
ballots themselves will bear no fruit, thus requiring resort to other types of
evidence to determine how the relevant individuals voted in the election.72
Third, even if a paper ballot or its functional equivalent was initially cast, it
may have been lost, stolen, destroyed, 3 or tampered with74 such that it, as a
practical matter, is not available.
In these contexts, case law has thus deemed it necessary to recognize
other ways to prove how specific individuals voted in any given election
contest. One source of such electoral evidence is from the voter herself,
who of course has firsthand knowledge of the tenor of her vote. This might
include the voter's own firsthand testimony regarding how she voted75 or
65. See, e.g., Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226, 1229 (1 1th Cir. 2006); Banfield v. Aichele, 51
A.3d 300, 305 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012); Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 4-6 (Tex. 2011).
66. See Crowley, 678 F.3d at 732.
67. See id.; Nguyen v. Nguyen, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
68. See, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Henry, 345 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Ark. 1961); Kuznik v.
Westmoreland Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 902 A.2d 476, 482-84, 500-01 (Pa. 2006); Oliphint v. Christy,
299 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex. 1957); Jeanne S. Zaino & Jeffrey T. Zaino, The Changing Landscape of
Election Disputes, 59 DiSP. RESOL. J. 11, 15 (2004).
69. See Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 607-08 (Ill. 1990); Helm v. State Election Bd., 589
P.2d 224, 234 (Okla. 1979).
70. See supra text accompanying note 68.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
72. See Crabbv. Orth, 32 N.E. 711, 712 (Ind. 1892).
73. See, e.g., Dixon v. Orr, 4 S.W. 774, 776 (Ark. 1887).
74. See, e.g., Wilburn v. Galloway, 179 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
75. See, e.g., Doss v. Chambers, 188 S.W. 260, 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
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intended to vote7 6 in the election, or it might be her out-of-court written or
oral statements to others regarding the tenor of her vote7 7 (or how she
intended to vote)78 that are offered into evidence. In the modem era, it
might include the voter posting a ballot "selfie"-a photograph of her
completed ballot-on social media.79
It is also possible that a third person may have firsthand knowledge of
how a specific individual voted and testifies directly to what she observed.
Perhaps the third person watched the voter fill out and cast her ballot, either
because the third person was another voter or an election worker who
improperly looked over the voter's shoulder (or at the completed ballot
itself) at a polling place 8° or-in a state such as Washington,81 Oregon,82 or
Colorado83 where voting is done almost entirely by mail-the voter showed
the third person the completed ballot before placing it in the mail.84
Alternatively, perhaps the third person helped the voter fill out the ballot
because the voter had a disability requiring the assistance of another
person.85 Moreover, if an effort is made to prove not the tenor of a specific
individual's vote, but rather to confirm the outcome of an election for
which the ballots have subsequently been lost, stolen, or destroyed, it may
be necessary to resort to the testimony or written records of those who
counted the ballots or the testimony of those who witnessed the count take
place.
86
Finally, in the absence of or in addition to direct evidence of how a
person voted, a party may offer circumstantial evidence of that fact.87 In the
days of distinctive preprinted ballots produced by competing candidates
and factions, this included evidence that a person was observed picking up
and casting such a ballot.88 Moreover, although people do not always vote
76. See, e.g., Gervais v. Rolfe, 187 P. 899, 900 (Mont. 1920).
77. See, e.g., Lauer v. Estes, 53 P. 262, 263 (Cal. 1898).
78. See, e.g., Moore v. Sharp, 41 S.W. 587, 590 (Tenn. 1897), overruled by Brown v. Hows, 40
S.W.2d 1017 (Tenn. 1931).
79. See generally Crookston v. Johnson, 841 F.3d 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2016); Rideout v. Gardner,
838 F.3d 65, 67 (1st Cir. 2016).
80. See, e.g., Rhyan v. Johnson, 2 N.E.2d 902, 903 (Ill. 1936); Widick v. Ralston, 197 S.W.2d
261, 267 (Ky. 1946); People ex rel. Williams v. Cicott, 16 Mich. 283, 313 (1868) (opinion of
Christiancy, J.) overruled in part by Petrie v. Curtis, 196 N.W.2d 761 (Mich. 1972).
81. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.40.010 (2013).
82. See OR. REV. STAT. § 254.465 (2007).
83. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-7.5-104 (2016).
84. See, e.g., Cicott, 16 Mich. at 313.
85. See, e.g., Lane v. Bailey, 75 P. 191, 195 (Mont. 1904).
86. See Dixon v. Orr, 4 S.W. 774, 776 (Ark. 1887); Kinder v. Sch. Dist. No. 126, 123 P. 610, 611
(Wash. 1912).
87. See Powers v. Harten, 167 N.W. 693, 695 (Iowa 1918); White v. Slama, 130 N.W. 978, 979-
80 (Neb. 1911); Montoya v. Ortiz, 175 P. 335, 338 (N.M. 1918).
88. See, e.g., Tunks v. Vincent, 51 S.W. 622, 624 (Ky. 1899); Wilkinson v. McGill, 64 A.2d 266,
273 (Md. 1949); People ex rel. Boyer v. Teague, 11 S.E. 665, 679-81 (N.C. 1890).
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in accordance with their party affiliations, such information is routinely
deemed to provide presumptive circumstantial evidence of whom an
individual likely voted for.89 Other examples of circumstantial evidence of
how a particular individual voted include the relationship between the voter
and either the candidates or the supporters of particular candidates or ballot
initiatives,9" her general statements of support for particular candidates or
initiatives,9 as well as evidence that the voter signed a petition to place a
particular candidate or issue on the ballot.
92
C. The Relevance of Electoral Evidence
The threshold for determining the admissibility of evidence-electoral
or otherwise-is relevance.93 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence and
their state law counterparts, evidence that is not relevant is inadmissible,
while evidence that is relevant is presumptively admissible unless subject
to exclusion pursuant to some other evidentiary rule.94 The definition of
relevance contains two separate requirements, materiality and probative
worth, both of which must be satisfied.95 Whether the evidence is offered to
prove a material fact-or one that is "of consequence in determining the
action"-tums on whether that fact is legally significant under the
governing substantive law at issue in the case.96 Assuming that it is, the
probative worth requirement is a liberal one97 that rarely serves as a barrier
to admissibility.98 To be sufficiently probative to satisfy the probative
worth requirement, evidence need only have "any tendency" to make a
89. See, e.g., Gribble v. Willeford, 546 N.E.2d 994, 999 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Tunks, 51 S.W. at
624; Dowling v. Orleans Par. Democratic Comm., 102 So. 2d 755, 763 (La. 1958); Wilkinson, 64 A.2d
at 273; In re Murphy, 243 A.2d 832, 835-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968); Moore v. Sharp, 41 S.W.
587, 590 (Tenn. 1896), overruled by Brown v. Hows, 40 S.W.2d 1017 (Tenn. 1930).
90. See, e.g., Widmayer v. Davis, 83 N.E. 87, 92 (Il. 1907); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 59 N.E. 555,
556 (Ill. 1901); Dowling, 102 So. 2d at 755; In re Murphy, 243 A.2d at 835-36; Moore, 41 S.W. at 590;
Beauregaard v. Gunnison City, 160 P. 815, 819 (Utah 1916).
91. See, e.g., Moore, 41 S.W. at 590.
92. See, e.g., Canales v. City of Alviso, 474 P.2d 417, 421-23 (Cal. 1970).
93. See Seidman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 1134, 1139 (5th Cir. 1991); Koloda v. Gen.
Motors Parts Div., 716 F.2d 373, 375 (6th Cir. 1983).
94. See FED. R. EviD. 402; Krist v. Eli Lilly & Co., 897 F.2d 293, 298 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 907 n.7 (5th Cir. 1978); see also JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET
A. BERGER, 6 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE T-30-T-33 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2009)
(setting forth analogous state law counterparts).
95. See generally PETER NICOLAS, EVIDENCE: A PROBLEM-BASED AND COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 6 (3d rev. ed. 2014).
96. Id.; United States v. Shomo, 786 F.2d 981, 985 (10th Cir. 1986).
97. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284-85 (2004); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993); United States v. Boros, 668 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 2012).
98. See Boros, 668 F.3d at 907 (citing Tennard, 542 U.S. at 285) ("A party faces a significant
obstacle in arguing that evidence should be barred because it is not relevant, given that the Supreme
Court has stated that there is a 'low threshold' for establishing that evidence is relevant.").
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material fact "more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." 99 Thus, any incremental effect 00 an item of evidence has,
"however slight,"10 ' in determining a material fact suffices to satisfy the
requirement of relevancy.
10 2
Under this liberal standard for determining relevancy, there are at least
three major ways in which electoral evidence can be deemed relevant. First,
such evidence may be substantively relevant in litigation over the outcome
of the very election that generated the electoral evidence. Second, it may be
substantively relevant in civil or criminal litigation wholly unrelated to the
election that generated the electoral evidence because it reveals valuable
insight into a given party's general or specific political mindset that might
shed light on whether she acted with a legally significant discriminatory
purpose or motivation. Finally, it might be relevant for the purpose of
revealing potential juror or witness bias against a party. These three bases
for deeming electoral evidence relevant are considered in turn below.
1. Substantive Relevance in Election Contests
Electoral evidence is most clearly relevant in cases in which there is a
dispute over the outcome of the very election that generated the electoral
evidence. Such cases involve a close election contest coupled with one of
the following six allegations: participation in the election by illegal
voters; 10 3 lost, stolen, or destroyed ballots;1°4 tampering with the ballots;
10 5
improper recording of votes (such as when a voting machine
malfunctions); 106 ambiguously marked ballots; 0 7 or wrongfully preventing
some individuals from voting in the election.108
The most frequently encountered scenario in which electoral evidence
is offered in judicial proceedings contesting the result of an election is
when there is an allegation that some voters-sufficient in number to
impact the election result-have voted illegally in the election. A voter's
participation in an election may be deemed illegal because she was not
99. FED. R. EviD. 401 (emphasis added).
100. See United States v. Certified Envtl. Servs., Inc., 753 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir. 2014).
101. United States v. Holmes, 413 F.3d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 2005).
102. This is because it is not the individual evidentiary force of each piece of evidence that must
satisfy the requisite standard of proof, but only the collective force of all evidence offered to prove a
particular point. See FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee's note ("A brick is not a wall .... ); United
States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 295 (3d Cir. 2007).
103. See, e.g., Belcher v. Mayor of Ann Arbor, 261 N.W.2d 56, 57 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
104. See, e.g., Dixon v. Orr, 4 S.W. 774, 776 (Ark. 1887).
105. See, e.g., Wilburn v. Galloway, 179 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
106. See, e.g., Helm v. State Election Bd., 589 P.2d 224, 226-27 (Okla. 1979).
107. See, e.g., Davis v. State ex reL Wren, 12 S.W. 957, 960 (Tex. 1889).
108. See, e.g., Rubens v. Hodges, 837 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Ark. 1992).
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registered (or not properly registered) to vote; 10 9 voted multiple times in the
same election;110 was a convicted felon who had lost her voting rights;''
was not a U.S. citizen;" 2 did not reside in the relevant jurisdiction;113 was
underage; 1 4 voted in a partisan primary without having registered with that
party;1 5 was bribed to vote a particular way in the election;" 6 or voted
using the name of a dead person or other voter." 7 To be sure, many such
cases are from an earlier era when election controls were less stringent than
they are today. For example, during the Prohibition Era-when towns were
voting on whether to be "wet" or "dry"--the alcohol industry and other
interested organizations would seek to win such elections by bribing people
to vote a particular way or bringing nonresidents in to illegally vote in the
elections. 18 However, these concerns also arise in modem-day elections. In
the 2004 gubernatorial election in Washington State, for example, the
margin of victory was only 129 votes, yet there was evidence that a far
greater number of persons had voted illegally, including 1,392 convicted
felons, 6 people who voted twice, and 19 people who cast votes using the
names of dead people. 19
The second type of election contest in which electoral evidence is
relevant is when there is a dispute over the outcome of the election and the
original ballots have been lost, stolen, or destroyed. 120 In such a case, it
may be necessary to resort to the testimony of the voters themselves and
109. See People ex rel. Boyer v. Teague, 11 S.E. 665, 670 (N.C. 1890).
110. See Widmayer v. Davis, 83 N.E. 87,91 (Ill. 1907); State v. Harris, 52 Vt. 216, 222 (1879).
111. See Huggins v. Superior Court, 788 P.2d 81, 82 (Ariz. 1990); City ofNewport v. Smith, 367
S.W.2d 742, 743 (Ark. 1963); Canales v. City of Alviso, 474 P.2d 417, 419 (Cal. 1970); Widmayer, 83
N.E. at 91; Medrano v. Gleinser, 769 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. App. 1989).
112. See Willis v. Crumbly, 268 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ark. 2007); Tate-Smith v. Cupples, 134
S.W.3d 535, 537 (Ark. 2003); Campbell v. Ramsey, 92 P.2d 819, 832 (Kan. 1939); Horton v. Sullivan,
86 A. 314, 316 (R.I. 1913); Savage v. Umphries, 118 S.W. 893, 898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
113. See Canales, 474 P.2d at 419; Taylor v. Pile, 391 P.2d 670, 672 (Colo. 1964); Widmayer, 83
N.E. at 90; Campbell, 92 P.2d at 832; Little v. Alexander, 80 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Ky. 1934); Belcher v.
Mayor of Ann Arbor, 261 N.W.2d 56, 57 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); Montgomery v. Dormer, 79 S.W. 913,
913 (Mo. 1904); Lane v. Bailey, 75 P. 191 (Mont. 1904); Montoya v. Ortiz, 175 P. 335, 336 (N.M.
1918); Rubuenog v. Aldan, 2010 MP 1 (N. Mar. I. 2010) (per curiam); Savage, 118 S.W. at 898.
114. See Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 17 N.E. 232, 248 (Ill. 1888); Miracle v. Robbins, 231 S.W.2d
18, 21 (Ky. 1950); Savage, 118 S.W. at 898.
115. See Huggins, 788 P.2d at 82; In re Orsatti, 598 A.2d 1341, 1343-44 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1991); Abbott v. Hunhoff, 491 N.W.2d 450, 451 (S.D. 1992).
116. See Canales, 474 P.2d at 419.
117. See Rhodes v. Driver, 64 S.W. 272, 275 (Ark. 1901).
118. See, e.g., Hanson v. Village of Adrian, 148 N.W. 276, 277 (Minn. 1914); Beauregaard v.
Gunnison City, 160 P. 815, 816 (Utah 1916).
119. See sources cited supra note 10.
120. See Dixon v. Orr, 4 S.W. 774, 776 (Ark. 1887); Young v. Deming, 33 P. 818, 818-19 (Utah
1893); Kinder v. Sch. Dist. No. 126, 123 P. 610, 610-11 (Wash. 1912).
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the election officials who tallied the original results in an effort to resolve
the outcome of the election.
121
The third type of election contest in which electoral evidence is
relevant is when there is a contest over the election result coupled with an
allegation that the ballots themselves have been tampered with such that
they do not, in fact, reflect the actual votes cast. 12 2 Claims of this sort were
most recently raised in the 2016 presidential election, with allegations that
foreign governments may have hacked DRE voting systems to benefit
Donald Trump. 123 In such a scenario, resort to other types of evidence-
such as the testimony of the individuals who actually voted in the election
(or, in the case of DRE voting systems, the backup paper trail)-may occur
in an effort to resolve the election.
124
The fourth type of election contest in which electoral evidence is
relevant is when there was some defect in the voting process that resulted
in a failure to properly record the votes of some portion of the electorate.
Examples include a malfunctioning mechanical-lever voting machine,'25 a
mistake or other imperfection in printed paper, punch-card, or optical-scan
ballots, 126 or some other defect in the voting process. 127 Under these
scenarios, parties have offered the testimony of the voters or other electoral
evidence in an effort to determine the election outcome. 12
8
The fifth type of election contest in which electoral evidence is relevant
is when a voter's intent is ambiguous and it is difficult to determine how to
count her vote. In an earlier day, when ballot secrecy was lacking and thus
a ballot could be tied to a particular voter, intent could be proven by resort
to testimony from the voter herself' 29 In more modem times, this is done
by inspecting the paper ballots in an effort to interpret the voter's intent, as
121. See sources cited supra note 120.
122. See McDonald v. Wood, 24 So. 86, 87-88 (Ala. 1898); Arrington v. Ladd, 56 S.W.2d 166,
167-68 (Ark. 1932); Metheny v. Pickel, 141 N.E. 762, 764 (111. 1923); Kuffel v. Wood, 137 N.E. 786,
787 (Ill. 1922); Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 17 N.E. 232, 243-44 (Ill. 1888); Strebin v. Lavengood, 71 N.E.
494, 498-99 (Ind. 1904); People ex rel. Deister v. Wintermute, 86 N.E. 818, 819 (N.Y. 1909); In re
Zupsic, 670 A.2d 629, 631 (Pa. 1996); Wilburn v. Galloway, 179 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex. Civ. App.
1944).
123. See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, ICA 2017-01D, BACKGROUND TO
"ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS": THE ANALYTIC
PROCESS AND CYBER INCIDENT ATTRIBUTION (2017).
124. See sources cited supra notes 123-24.
125. See, e.g., Kirby v. Wood, 558 S.W.2d 180, 181 (Ky. 1977); In re Moffat, 361 A.2d 74, 75-
78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Deister, 86 N.E. at 819; Helm v. State Election Board, 589 P.2d
224, 226-27 (Okla. 1979).
126. See, e.g., Babnew v. Linneman, 740 P.2d 511, 512 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (voters given the
wrong paper ballot).
127. See, e.g., State ex rel. Beu v. Lockwood, 165 N.W. 330, 330-33 (Iowa 1917).
128. See sources cited supra notes 125-27.
129. See Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 17 N.E. 232, 249-51 (111. 1888); McKinnon v. People ex rel.
Malzacher, 110 Ill. 305, 306 (Ill. 1884); Davis v. State ex rel. Wren, 12 S.W. 957, 960 (Tex. 1889).
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was famously attempted in the contested 2000 election between George W.
Bush and Al Gore.
130
The final type of election contest in which electoral evidence is
relevant is one in which the outcome is close and some individuals-
sufficient in number to impact the outcome of the election-were
unlawfully prevented from voting or registering to vote. Thus, whether due
to malfeasance on the part of election officials or due to an error in the
voting records, certain people may have been wrongfully turned away at
the polls. 131 Alternatively, they may have formally been permitted to cast a
ballot but-as a result of error on the part of an election official in a polling
place containing paper ballots and machines for people voting in multiple
jurisdictions-they were given the wrong ballots or were directed to a
machine that did not include the option to vote in the particular contest at
issue, thus effectively disenfranchising them. 132 In such a scenario, voter
testimony or other electoral evidence is relevant to prove how the
individual would have voted if given the opportunity to do so.1
33
Without question, in any of these scenarios, electoral evidence-
whether in the form of voter testimony regarding how she voted or
intended to vote or in some other direct or circumstantial form-would be
probative in trying to prove the actual tenor of the person's vote, seemingly
making the question of relevancy a straightforward one. Yet, as indicated
above, the definition of relevance also requires that the evidence be offered
to prove or disprove a material fact as defined by the underlying
substantive law.1 34 Thus, for example, if there is an allegation that some
individuals voted illegally in an election, evidence of how they voted is
relevant only if the underlying substantive law requires proof of how they
actually voted. In some jurisdictions-those that follow the "direct
evidence" approach-such evidence is unquestionably material. Under this
approach, when there is proof of illegally cast votes, the court hears
evidence-primarily voter testimony regarding who they voted for-in an
effort to determine the proper outcome of the election. 1
35
130. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-08 (2000).
131. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Between Consol. Sch. Dist., 156 S.E. 654, 656 (Ga. 1931); Pennington
v. Hare, 62 N.W. 116, 117 (Minn. 1895); Plouzek v. Saline Cty. Reorganization Comm., 148 N.W.2d
919, 920-21 (Neb. 1967); Martin v. McGarr, 117 P. 323, 324 (Okla. 1910); Pawlowski v. Thompson,
264 N.W. 723, 723-24 (S.D. 1936).
132. See, e.g., Babnew v. Linneman, 740 P.2d 511, 512 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Rubens v.
Hodges, 837 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Ark. 1992).
133. See sources cited supra notes 131-32.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
135. See Rubuenog v. Aldan, 2010 MP 1, 13-16 (N. Mar. I. 2010) (per curiam); Carlson v.
Oconto Cty. Bd. of Canvassers, 623 N.W.2d 195, 198-99 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000); Harv. L. Rev. Ass'n,
Developments in the Law: Voting and Democracy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 1157-61 (2006). In
jurisdictions that follow the "direct evidence" approach, the underlying substantive election law
typically does not empower courts to set aside an election, and so even if there are allegations of illegal
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However, not all jurisdictions in the United States follow the "direct
evidence" approach. Two other common approaches include the
"proportional approach" and the "elimination of uncertainty" approach.1 36
Under the "proportional approach," when there is proof of illegal votes in
specific precincts, the court will simply deduct illegal votes from the vote
totals of each candidate in proportion to the total votes received by each
candidate in the precincts where illegal votes were cast, without any
attempt to figure out who the illegal voters actually voted for.' 37 Under the
"elimination of uncertainty" approach, if the total number of illegal votes
exceeds the winner's margin of victory, the court will simply order a new
election, without any attempt to figure out the tenor of the illegally cast
votes. 1 38 Clearly, it is only if a jurisdiction follows the "direct evidence"
approach, and not one of the other approaches, that electoral evidence
calculated to prove how specific individuals voted is material and thus
relevant. Accordingly, application of the relevance standard in this context
requires in each case an examination of the underlying substantive election
law.
Similarly, when people have been unlawfully prevented from voting,
whether their testimony or other evidence of how they would have voted is
deemed relevant turns on the underlying substantive election law. As in the
case of illegally cast votes, some jurisdictions follow the "direct evidence"
approach, in which case such electoral evidence is material and thus
relevant.1 39 Yet other jurisdictions deem such evidence immaterial,
declaring the remedy in such a case to be invalidation of the election if
enough voters were excluded to change the result (the "elimination of
uncertainty approach"),1 40 and still others let the election stand, deeming
the appropriate remedy to be criminal prosecution of those interfering with
the right of certain persons to vote. 141
voting, in the face of uncertainty regarding how those individuals voted, the (albeit tainted) election
results stand. See Brannon v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 292 P.3d 234, 245 (Idaho 2012); Jaycox v.
Vamum, 226 P. 285, 289 (Idaho 1924).
136. See sources cited supra note 135.
137. See id.
138. See id Some states follow a hybrid approach. See Akaka v. Yoshina, 935 P.2d 98, 100-01
(Haw. 1997); In re Murphy, 243 A.2d 832, 834-35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968); Reese v. Duncan,
80 S.W.3d 650, 663 (Tex. App. 2002).
139. See, e.g., Plouzek v. Saline Cty. Reorganization Comm., 148 N.W.2d 919, 920-21 (Neb.
1967).
140. See, e.g., Rubens v. Hodges, 837 S.W.2d 465, 467-68 (Ark. 1992); Hammill v. Valentine,
373 S.E.2d 9, 10 (Ga. 1988); Taggart v. Phillips, 249 S.E.2d 245, 246 (Ga. 1978); Briscoe v. Between
Consol. Sch. Dist., 156 S.E. 654, 656 (Ga. 1931); In re Harper, 456 S.E.2d 878, 881 (N.C. Ct. App.
1995); Martin v. McGarr, 117 P. 323, 327 (Okla. 1910); Pawlowski v. Thompson, 264 N.W. 723, 723-
24 (S.D. 1936).
141. See, e.g., Pawlowski, 264 N.W. at 723-24.
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In sum, assuming that the underlying substantive election law at issue
in the case deems it legally significant to determine how certain individuals
voted, electoral evidence offered to prove that point in an election contest
will nearly always satisfy the basic evidentiary gateway requirement of
relevance. Accordingly, such evidence will be presumptively admissible
unless subject to exclusion by some other evidentiary principle.
2. Substantive Relevance in Other Types of Cases
While electoral evidence is most obviously relevant in cases involving
contests over the election results themselves, its relevance is not limited to
such cases. An individual's voting record-when considered in light of the
liberal standard for relevance set forth above 142-- can also provide valuable
evidence of whether a party acted with the requisite discriminatory intent in
a variety of different types of civil or criminal litigation.
The need to prove discriminatory purpose arises with some frequency
in two different types of cases. The first are civil cases in which someone is
accused of discriminating against a given person in employment, housing,
public accommodations, or for some other purpose because of the alleged
victim's race, sex, sexual orientation, or other characteristic. In such cases,
not only is direct evidence of animus on that basis relevant; rather, under
the liberal standard for relevance, any indirect evidence that sheds light on
the defendant's alleged discriminatory intent is also relevant.1 43 For
example, in a case in which a university is accused of discriminating
against an employee because of her sex, evidence that her supervisor
expressed negative views towards "women's issues"-such as by making
negative comments about "Women's Studies" and refusing to approve
courses with a focus on gender-is relevant in attempting to prove
discriminatory intent. 144
The second are criminal cases in which someone stands accused of
committing a crime with a specific discriminatory purpose, say, because of
the victim's race, sex, sexual orientation, or other characteristic. In such
cases-because it is difficult to find direct evidence of the defendant's
specific motivation-courts deem relevant indirect evidence that helps shed
light on the defendant's discriminatory purpose. 145 For example, in a case
in which a defendant is accused of committing a racially motivated hate
142. See supra text accompanying notes 93-102.
143. See Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 590 (10th Cir. 1992).
144. See, e.g., Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1343 (9th Cir. 1981);
Kraemer v. Franklin & Marshall Coll., No. CIV.A. 95-0020, 1995 WL 672523, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
145. See generally Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1993).
2017]
Alabama Law Review
crime, evidence of racist literature found in the defendant's home is
relevant in helping to establish discriminatory intent. 
146
Outside the context of election contests themselves, electoral evidence
is most clearly relevant in an employment discrimination case alleging
discrimination on the basis of political affiliation. 147 Such causes of action
can be grounded in the First Amendment, 14 a statute,149 or both 15 and
require as an element of the underlying cause of action proof "that the
plaintiff and defendant have opposing political affiliations. ' 15 Thus, for
example, evidence that a supervisor always voted for Democratic
candidates would be relevant in an employment discrimination case in
which the supervisor is accused of unlawfully firing someone because of
the employee's visible political support of Republican candidates and
152
causes.
Electoral evidence would also arguably be relevant-although with far
less probative force-in cases involving discrimination on some basis other
than political affiliation. For example, an employee who alleges that she
was fired from her job because she is transgender might contend that her
supervisor's consistent votes in favor of Republican candidates-who tend
overwhelmingly to oppose transgender rights153 -is relevant in determining
whether the supervisor acted with discriminatory intent. Similarly, an
employee who alleges that she was fired from her job because she is an
evangelical Christian might contend that her boss's consistent votes in
favor of Democratic candidates-who tend to oppose the policy
preferences of evangelical Christians 154 -is likewise relevant. Although the
probative force is admittedly far weaker than in the context of a political
affiliation claim, the evidentiary threshold for relevance is a low one under
the Federal Rules of Evidence and their state law counterparts, making
such evidence potentially admissible.
Although theoretically relevant and thus potentially admissible in a
large swath of cases, for two reasons, the admissibility of electoral
146. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 341 F.3d 870, 885-88 (9th Cir. 2003).
147. See, e.g., Vinci v. Quagliani, No. 3:08-cv-01935, 2010 WL 1792762, at *1 (D. Conn. May
4, 2010); D'Aurizio v. Borough of Palisades Park, 899 F. Supp. 1352, 1353 (D.N.J. 1995).
148. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 72 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507, 513-17 (1980).
149. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 146 (2013); D.C. CODE § 32-408 (2008).
150. See D'Aurizio v. Borough of Palisades Park, 899 F. Supp. 1352, 1353 (D.N.J. 1995).
151. See, e.g., Flores-Silva v. McClintock-Hernandez, 710 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting
Torres-Santiago v. Municipality of Adjuntas, 693 F.3d 230, 236 (1st Cir. 2012) (additional citation
omitted)).
152. It was in this context that the only federal court decision regarding the existence of a federal
political vote privilege was decided. See D 'Aurizio, 899 F. Supp. at 1353.
153. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 18.
154. Emma Green, Democrats Have a Religion Problem, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 29, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/democrats-have-a-religion-problem/510761/.
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evidence outside of contests regarding the election results themselves has
received scant attention in judicial opinions. First, although evidence of a
person's general political leanings is highly relevant in a case in which the
person is accused of discrimination on the basis of political affiliation, such
causes of action are relatively rare' 55 and limited in scope. 156 Second,
because the probative link between a person's general political preferences
and her willingness to discriminate against a person for a more targeted
reason-such as due to her sexual orientation, religion, or other
characteristic-is a tenuous one, parties are unlikely to offer electoral
evidence for such purposes. Even if they do, courts-while acknowledging
its arguable probative value-are likely to exclude such evidence under
Federal Rule 403 or its state law counterparts, which allow for the
exclusion of admittedly relevant evidence when its probative value is
substantially outweighed by such dangers as the trier of fact giving the
evidence undue weight relative to its true probative force or otherwise
misusing the evidence.
157
However, while votes cast in traditional election contests for specific
candidates only provide insight into general political leanings that may be
of marginal relevance in most cases, votes cast in discrete election contests
in recent decades involving such hot-button issues as gay158 and
transgender rights, 159 race-based affirmative action, 16 religious freedom,
1 61
tort reform, 162 and abortion rights1 63 provide insight into a voter's views
about discrete categories of persons that are likely to be of greater
relevance in a larger number of cases. For this reason, the admissibility of
electoral evidence is likely to garner greater judicial attention in the near
future. For example, that a supervisor voted in favor of a state ballot
initiative prohibiting same-sex marriage may have substantial probative
value in determining whether his decision to fire a gay employee was based
on anti-gay animus. Similarly, evidence that a defendant voted in favor of a
ballot initiative requiring a transgender person to use the bathroom
associated with his or her gender assigned at birth would be probative in
determining her state of mind when accused of committing a "hate crime"
by assaulting a transgender person while she was using the bathroom that is
instead associated with her gender identity. That a supervisor voted in favor
155. See supra note 21.
156. See supra note 22.
157. See FED. R. EvID. 403; FED. R. EViD. 403 advisory committee's note.
158. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 23.
159. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 24.
160. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 25.
161. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 26.
162. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 27.
163. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 28.
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of a state constitutional amendment prohibiting race-based affirmative
action in public university admissions is probative in determining whether
she acted with racial bias against an African-American employee.
Similarly, that a supervisor voted against a ballot initiative allowing school
vouchers to be used at parochial schools is probative in determining
whether her decision to fire a Catholic employee was related to religious
bias.
To be sure, even in these examples involving modem ballot initiatives
about discrete issues, the mere fact that the defendant voted a particular
way is hardly ironclad proof that she acted with discriminatory intent in
another context. After all, one can simultaneously hold a belief that same-
sex marriage is wrong and that gay employees should be free from
discrimination in the workplace. Similarly, one can legitimately oppose
both affirmative action programs and discrimination against African-
Americans in the employment context. Yet it is also surely the case that
opposing same-sex marriage makes it at least somewhat more likely that
one harbors more general anti-gay bias, and that opposing affirmative
action makes it somewhat more likely that one harbors animus toward
racial minorities, at least enough to pass muster under the liberal standard
of relevancy set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence and their state law
counterparts. Moreover, the probative force of such evidence is certainly
greater than the more indirect inferences drawn from a voter's support for
Democratic and Republican candidates discussed above. Accordingly, in
light of the liberal standard of relevancy embodied in the rules of
evidence---coupled with the fact that exclusion of evidence under Federal
Rule 403 and its state law counterparts is warranted only when the
probative force of evidence is substantially outweighed by such risks as the
jury overvaluing or otherwise misusing the evidence164 and is thus tilted in
favor of admissibility16 5 -it is likely that in the near future courts will deem
such evidence admissible in civil and criminal cases requiring proof of
discriminatory intent.
3. Relevance for Impeachment Purposes
Electoral evidence is potentially relevant and thus admissible not only
for the substantive purposes recounted above, but also for the purpose of
revealing potential juror or witness bias against a party. Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence and their state law counterparts, when a witness gives
testimony that is unfavorable to a party-particularly the accused in a
criminal case-the party is generally afforded a fair opportunity to impeach
164. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
165. See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1977).
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the witness on the ground that she is biased against the party, with the
concept of "bias" broadly construed. 166 The U.S. Supreme Court has held
that "[p]roof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of
fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all
evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness'
testimony."' 67 Indeed, in criminal cases, that construction of relevance has
constitutional underpinnings grounded in the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause.168 For similar reasons, proof of potential juror bias
against a party is likewise relevant and, in criminal cases, the right to probe
into such potential bias through the voir dire process is grounded in the
Sixth Amendment's right to an impartial jury. 169
Electoral evidence-both in the form of votes cast for partisan offices
and those cast for specific ballot measures-can be highly probative for the
purpose of revealing potential juror or witness bias against a party.' 70 With
respect to witnesses, for example, if one party to a civil action is a
supporter of Republican candidates and policies, evidence that a witness
testifying against her at trial is a die-hard Democrat who is aware of the
party's political leanings is relevant in assessing the witness's credibility.
Similarly, in the case of potential jurors, if a party in a politically charged
criminal case is a high-profile Republican-such as when former White
House aide Scooter Libby stood trial on charges of lying to federal
investigators about leaking the identity of a CIA operative 71--evidence of
a potential juror's political leanings is relevant in assessing whether she can
be impartial.1 72 Or in a case in which a politically conservative plaintiff is
suing her employer for discriminating against her on the basis of political
affiliation, the political leanings of a potential juror are likewise relevant in
determining whether or not she can be impartial. 73 Indeed, the more
politically charged the underlying case itself, the more probative will be the
166. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49-51 (1984); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-
20 (1974).
167. Abel, 469 U.S. at 52.
168. See id. at 50.
169. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729-30 (1992).
170. See Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 411-16 (1895); United States v. Gonzalez-
Quezada, 108 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Goland, 959 F.2d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1992);
Harrington v. City of Portland, No. 87-516-FR, 1990 WL 15688, at *1 (D. Or. Feb. 8, 1990); Kyle v.
State, 366 P.2d 961, 966 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961); Wallace v. State, No. 03-03-00150, 2004 WL
1403492, at *6 (Tex. App. June 24, 2004); Butler v. State, No. 01-94-00756, 1995 WL 416892, at *7-8
(Tex. App. July 13, 1995); ROGER PARK & TOM LININGER, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE: IMPEACHMENT AND REHABILITATION § 6.2 (2016).
171. See Politics out Front as Libby Jury Selection Begins, NBC NEWS, Jan. 16, 2007,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/I 6638924/ns/politics/t/politics-out-front-libby-jury-selection-
begins/#.WC9T8k0zWDY.
172. See, e.g., Wagner v. Jones, 928 F. Supp. 2d 1084,1101-03, 1102 n.20 (S.D. Iowa 2013).
173. See id.
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underlying political leanings of the witness or prospective juror vis-d-vis
those of a party to the case, 174 although-given the liberal standard of
relevancy under the rules of evidence-such evidence still carries probative
force even when the underlying substantive case is relatively mundane.
As in the case of electoral evidence offered for substantive purposes in
cases involving allegations of discriminatory intent, more recent electoral
contests involving votes on politically charged issues can provide more
targeted insight into potential witness or juror bias in a variety of
circumstances. Thus, for example, how a prospective juror voted on a
failed ballot initiative to cap tort damages would have significant probative
value in determining whether she could fairly determine a plaintiffs
damages under controlling law. 175 In a criminal case, how a juror voted on
a ballot initiative regarding the repeal or reinstatement of the death penalty
would be relevant in trying to assess her suitability as a juror in a death
penalty-eligible case. 176 In a criminal case involving a defendant who is a
racial minority, how a juror voted on a ballot initiative that reflected racial
bias would be relevant in assessing her potential bias against the accused.
177
Similarly, in assessing the veracity of a witness who testifies against an
openly gay party, it would be relevant to the trier of fact that the witness
has consistently voted against gay rights at the ballot box, particularly if the
underlying case involves a related issue, such as a discrimination claim
against an employer alleging anti-gay bias. Or, in a case in which the facts
at trial would reveal that one of the parties procured an abortion, that a
juror voted in favor of a personhood initiative declaring that life begins at
conception would be probative in determining her potential bias against
that party.
Finally, electoral evidence is also relevant for the purpose of
impeaching a witness who testifies by means of a prior inconsistent
statement regarding the tenor of her vote. Consider, for example, an
electoral contest in which an illegal voter is asked how she voted in the
election. Suppose that she indicates that she voted in favor of the
Democratic candidate in the contest at issue. Evidence that she in fact voted
in favor of the Republican candidate-in the form of earlier statements she
wrote or made to third persons-would be relevant to impeach her
174. See Rose v. Sheedy, 134 S.w.2d 18, 19 (Mo. 1939); Henderson v. Dreyfus, 191 P. 442, 453
(N.M. 1919); Territory of New Mexico v. Lynch, 133 P. 405,407-08 (N.M. 1913).
175. See, e.g., Thomas v. Hardwick, 231 P.3d 1111, 1114-15, 1114 n.4 (Nev. 2010).
176. See People v. Stevens, 158 P.3d 763, 772 (Cal. 2007); People v. Famam, 47 P.3d 988, 1012
(Cal. 2002); People v. Ochoa, 966 P.2d 442, 488 (Cal. 1998).
177. See People v. Wells, 149 Cal. App. 3d 721, 726 (1983).
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credibility as a witness and in turn would help the trier of fact assess
whether to deduct her vote from the Democratic candidate's vote tally. 178
II. THE DANGERS OF ELECTORAL EVIDENCE
As demonstrated in Part I, electoral evidence will often be deemed
relevant and thus presumptively admissible for a variety of substantive
purposes as well as for the purpose of impeaching witnesses and potential
jurors for bias. Yet, while satisfying the low standard for presumptive
admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence and their state law
counterparts, admitting electoral evidence is not without its risks.
Specifically, electoral evidence raises three concerns that should give
courts and policy makers pause in considering whether to admit it. First,
electoral evidence-particularly when it comes in the form of testimony by
the voter herself or evidence of her out-of-court oral or written statements
regarding the tenor of her vote-is of dubious trustworthiness. 179 Second,
admitting electoral evidence undermines the common law,180 statutory, 81
and constitutional 182 rights to ballot secrecy, which further not only voters'
individual interests1 83 but also societal interests in preventing vote buying,
voter intimidation, and other historical practices that led to the enactment
of laws ensuring a right to vote by secret ballot. 184 Finally, there is a
substantial risk that electoral evidence may be overvalued or misused by
the trier of fact, or that the very act of admitting such evidence may send
the wrong message to jurors and society about the role of political
affiliations in the judicial process. Although electoral evidence nearly
always presents these three dangers, the relative risk it presents will vary in
part depending upon the type of proceeding in which it arises. Thus, while
the interest in ballot secrecy will be undermined in nearly every type of
case, the risk of untrustworthiness is most acute in election contests, while
178. See Smith v. Thomas, 54 P. 71, 71 (Cal. 1898). To introduce extrinsic evidence of the prior
inconsistent statements, the witness must be afforded an opportunity to deny or explain them. See FED.
R. EVD. 613(b). Because such statements are material to a substantive issue in the case, extrinsic
evidence would not be barred by the collateral matter rule. See United States v. Roulette, 75 F.3d 418,
423 (8th Cir. 1996).
179. See, e.g., Lauer v. Estes, 53 P. 262, 263 (Cal. 1898); Pennington v. Hare, 62 N.W. 116, 117
(Minn. 1895); In re Harper, 456 S.E.2d 878, 881 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
180. See, e.g., People ex rel. Boyer v. Teague, 11 S.E. 665, 679-81 (N.C. 1890).
181. See sources cited supra note 31.
182. See, e.g., Wood v. Kirby, 566 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Ky. 1978) (citing KY. CONST. § 147);
Belcher v. Mayor of Ann Arbor, 262 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Mich. 1978) (citing MICH. CONST. art. II, § 4).
183. See sources cited supra note 31.
184. See N.D. R. EviD. 506 explanatory note; D'Aurizio v. Borough of Palisades Park, 899 F.
Supp. 1352, 1358-59 (D.N.J. 1995); In re Orsatti, 598 A.2d 1341, 1343-44 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991);
McCavitt v. Registrars of Voters, 434 N.E.2d 620, 631 (Mass. 1982); People ex rel. Williams v. Cicott,
16 Mich. 283, 313-14 (Mich. 1868) (opinion of Campbell, J.).
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the risk of overvaluing or misusing the evidence will be most acute in other
types of proceedings.
A. The Trustworthiness of Electoral Evidence
The first risk associated with electoral evidence is its dubious
trustworthiness when offered in the form of testimony by the voter herself
or evidence of her out-of-court oral or written statements regarding the
tenor of her vote. To be sure, in both of these instances the voter is
recounting either to a court or to third persons an event about which the
voter has undoubted firsthand knowledge. Indeed, save for the unusual
instance in which someone else observed her cast her vote, she will often
be the only person with such firsthand knowledge.
On the one hand, testimony by a voter in this circumstance should in
theory be no different from the myriad other factual circumstances in which
a witness might perjure herself, for which the remedy is typically not
exclusion of the evidence but instead vigorous cross-examination and
appropriate weighing by the trier of fact.' 85 Moreover, when electoral
evidence is offered in a case involving a contest over the very election
itself, failing to admit it cuts against another important policy interest, that
of accurately determining election outcomes. 186 Yet there are a number of
qualities about electoral evidence in the form of voter testimony or voter
statements to third persons that makes it far less trustworthy than other
types of evidence.
First, one of the unusual qualities about admitting a voter's testimony
regarding the tenor of her vote or her statements to third persons regarding
the same is that-when resorted to-there is virtually never evidence of
that fact independent of the voter's testimony or statement itself.' 87 In other
words, because ballots are no longer individually numbered and tied to
specific voters, and because it is rare for a third party to observe a person
actually cast her vote,' 88 there is seldom other evidence that parties to a
dispute can rely on to test the veracity of a voter who recounts her vote.
Only if there are other types of indicia of how she might have voted-such
185. See State ex ret. Ben v. Lockwood, 165 N.W. 330, 333 (Iowa 1917); Olson v. Fleming, 254
P.2d 335, 337 (Kan. 1953); Trahan v. Simmons, 2 So. 2d 575, 576 (Miss. 1941); Wood v. State ex rel.
Lee, 126 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tex. 1939); Doss v. Chambers, 188 SW. 260, 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916);
Savage v. Umphries, 118 S.W. 893, 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909); Carlson v. Oconto Cty. Bd. of
Canvassers, 623 N.W.2d 195, 199 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).
186. See Gantt v. Brown, 142 S.W 422, 425 (Mo. 1911).
187. See, e.g., Pennington v. Hare, 62 N.W. 116, 117 (Minn. 1895). Although a ballot selfie
might be perceived as compelling evidence of how a person voted, that assumes that the ballot the
person is depicted with is the one she actually cast and that the photograph has not otherwise been
doctored.
188. See, e.g., Kinder v. Sch. Dist. No. 126, 123 P. 610, 611 (Wash. 1912).
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as known party affiliation1 89 or the voter's own contrary statements
regarding the tenor of her vote to third personsl9°-is the trier of fact in any
position to accurately weigh the voter's testimony. While this risk is
theoretically present in other types of cases-a given crime, for example,
such as a sexual assault, may have been witnessed only by the alleged
perpetrator and victim-in no other category of case is the absence of
evidence extrinsic of the testimony of a single person with an interest in the
outcome of the proceeding the norm rather than the exception.' 91
Second, people are particularly likely to be untruthful when recounting
how they voted in an election. Courts have noted, for example, that "it is no
rare thing for a voter to cast her ballot in a different manner than he has
indicated to one or the other of the candidates,"'1 92 and have even described
the right to vote by secret ballot as providing voters with an implied "legal
right of deceiving others as to the vote.'  Particularly when her vote in
favor of a particular candidate or ballot initiative is out-of-step with the
politics of her social and work circles-such as a vote in favor of Donald
Trump or a ban on same-sex marriage in a politically liberal city-a desire
not to be treated as a social pariah may impel a voter to inaccurately
recount her vote.'
1 94
This instinctive judicial dubiousness of voter testimony or statements
regarding the tenor of their votes is confirmed by what social scientists
refer to as "social desirability bias," which is defined as a tendency among
people to "give answers they perceive to be socially desirable regardless of
their own true positions."' 95 In the realm of voting, this phenomenon was
first referred to as the "Bradley effect," a reference to California's 1982
gubernatorial election. 196 In that election, Tom Bradley, an African-
American candidate, narrowly lost to George Deukmejian despite being
heavily favored in pre-election polls. 197 Some proportion of voters, not
wanting to be perceived by others as racist-even by pollsters that they did
not personally know-thus indicated they were voting for Bradley even
though they intended to and did vote for Deukmejian.' 98 Some believe that
189. See sources cited supra note 89.
190. See Kinder, 123 P. at 611.
191. In contrast, in a case involving an unwitnessed sexual assault, the trier of fact has the
opportunity to listen to and weigh the competing testimony of the accused and the victim along with
any forensic evidence and evidence of the defendant's prior acts of sexual assault.
192. See Laleman v. Bredesen, 36 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Ill. 1941).
193. See People ex rel. Williams v. Cicott, 16 Mich. 283, 313 (1868) (opinion of Christiancy, J.).
194. See, e.g., Smith v. Thomas, 54 P. 71, 72 (Cal. 1898).
195. See Powell, supra note 30, at 1054; accord Matthew J. Streb et al., Social Desirability
Effects and Support for a Female American President, 72 PuB. OP. Q. 76, 78-80 (2008).
196. See Powell, supra note 30, at 1053.
197. See id.
198. See id.
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the discrepancy between the pre-election polling and the outcome of the
2016 presidential election between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump may
have likewise been an instance of social desirability bias at play. 199 A
similar discrepancy between pre-election polling and actual results has also
been found with votes on sensitive social issues, such as same-sex
marriage200 and race-based affirmative action.20 1 Due to the increasing
social stigma associated with what are perceived to be expressions of
"potentially discriminatory, insensitive, or unfavorable opinions related to
topics such as gender, race, ethnicity, disabilities, and sexuality," some
voters may mask their true vote on ballot issues related to such matters in
order to avoid being stigmatized.20 2 Thus, the untrustworthiness of voter
testimony or statements by a voter regarding the tenor of her vote differs
from the general risks associated with witness testimony in that there is
documented evidence of it in this specific context.20 3
The general untrustworthiness of a voter's statements regarding the
tenor of her vote set forth above is further exacerbated in four
circumstances. The first three arise when the voter is asked to testify
regarding the tenor of her vote in the very election at issue in the case itself,
while the fourth situation arises when what is involved is not voter
testimony but rather the voter's out-of-court written or spoken statements
to third persons.
First, as a general matter, the problem of untrustworthiness is enhanced
when the voter testimony involves the very election contest that is at issue
in the case. Having voted in the election, the individual clearly has some
interest in the outcome of the contest, and-particularly when the vote
margin is small-she is aware of the impact her testimony can have on the
199. See, e.g., Allen Johnson, 'Trump Effect' May Have Been Part of Pollsters 'Downfall, NEWS
& REcORD (Nov. 25, 2016), http://www.greensboro.com/blogs/allen-johnson-trump-effect-may-have-
been-part-of-pollsters/article_982a8280-b3af-5176-8f64-7 leeacaa4b47.html.
200. See Powell, supra note 30, at 1065-66.
201. See Michigan Civil Rights Amendment, Proposal 2 (2016), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/MichiganCivilRights Amendment, Proposal_
2_(2006) (last visited Oct. 1, 2016).
202. See Powell, supra note 30, at 1056; accord Streb, supra note 195, at 78-79. Social
desirability bias is not necessarily unidirectional but rather depends upon the individual voter's key
social reference group. See Jeffrey R. Lax et al., Are Survey Respondents Lying About Their Support for
Same-Sex Marriage? Lessons from a List Experiment, 80 PUB. Op. Q. 510, 521-23, 527 (2016). Thus, a
religious conservative voter who supports same-sex marriage but who is active in a religious
community that opposes it may falsely state her intent to vote against same-sex marriage, while a
Democrat opposed to same-sex marriage might falsely state her intent to vote in favor of same-sex
marriage. See id.
203. Although statements to pollsters are not under oath and thus not completely predictive of
how someone might testify when under oath, a voter's out-of-court oral or written statements regarding
the tenor of her vote are likewise not under oath. Moreover, the research on social desirability bias
demonstrates at the very least that it is more likely someone might testify falsely when inquiry into how
they voted is at issue as contrasted with other types of matters. See Powell, supra note 30, at 1065.
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outcome of the case.2 4 Consider, for example, someone who in fact voted
in the 2016 presidential election for either Jill Stein or Gary Johnson, but
whose vote was not properly recorded due to a voting machine
malfunction. Suppose further that the 2016 election was far closer-akin to
the 2000 presidential election-and that the outcome of the electoral votes
in that individual's state would decide the presidential election. It may have
been one thing to cast a protest vote for Stein or Johnson when the voter
thought that Hillary Clinton was probably going to win, but post-election
when the voter realizes that her testimony will either swing the election to
Clinton or Trump, her perspective-and in turn, her characterization of her
prior vote-may change.
Second, there is additional reason to be concerned about the
trustworthiness of voter testimony in an election contest when it is not that
of a legal voter whose vote the court seeks to clarify, but rather that of an
illegal voter whose vote the court seeks to exclude. Just as with the legal
voter, her participation in the election indicates an interest in its outcome.
Moreover, to the extent that her illegal participation in the election was
based on corrupt intent (as contrasted with mistake), her trustworthiness is
more suspect.20 5 Indeed, by falsely stating that she voted the opposite of
how she actually did, she can double the effect of her vote, since if her
testimony is accepted the court will not only be maintaining her vote in
favor of her preferred candidate or position but also subtracting a vote from
the opposing one. °6
Third, even if one is willing to countenance testimony from actual
voters-both legal and illegal--one might nonetheless be more skeptical of
testimony from theoretical voters. Thus, courts routinely reject testimony
by wrongfully excluded voters as to how they would have voted if they had
been permitted to do so. 20 7 In such a circumstance, the danger that the voter
might shade her testimony now that she knows the precise impact it would
have on the outcome of the election is exacerbated by the speculative
nature of her testimony. This is because instead of testifying about a known
fact-how she actually voted-she is testifying about what she thinks she
204. See Metheny v. Pickel, 141 N.E. 762, 766 (Ill. 1923); Young v. Deming, 33 P. 818, 820-21
(Utah 1893).
205. See generally Van Winkle v. Crabtree, 55 P. 831, 835 (Or. 1899).
206. See Leach v. Johnson, 313 N.E.2d 636, 642 (111. App. Ct. 1974); In re Gen. Election of Nov.
5, 1991, 605 A.2d 1164, 1186 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992); In re Harper, 456 S.E.2d 878, 881 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1995); Van Winkle, 55 P. at 835; State ex rel Bell v. Conness, 82 N.W. 288, 290 (Wis. 1900).
207. See Briscoe v. Between Consol. Sch. Dist., 156 S.E. 654, 656 (Ga. 1931); McCavitt v.
Registrars of Voters, 434 N.E.2d 620, 630-31 (Mass. 1982); People ex rel. Boyer v. Teague, 11 S.E.
665, 680 (N.C. 1890); Martin v. McGarr, 117 P. 323, 327 (Okla. 1910); Pawlowski v. Thompson, 264
N.W. 723, 724 (S.D. 1936); Ferguson v. Allen, 26 P. 570, 573 (Utah 1891).
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would have done if she had been able to vote, which may be colored in part
by post-election events, including her knowledge of the close outcome.20 8
Fourth, even if one is willing to accept the risks described above when
in-court voter testimony about the tenor of her vote is involved, there are
additional risks associated with admitting the voter's out-of-court written or
oral statements about the same. When a voter comes into court and testifies
as to how she voted in an election, she is under oath and thus subject to the
penalty of perjury for falsely testifying, and thus she has at least a
theoretical incentive to testify truthfully.209 But her out-of-court written or
spoken hearsay statements are not made under similar circumstances, and
thus there is even less assurance that she is speaking truthfully, since there
is no legal consequence for making a false statement.210 Moreover, when a
witness is recounting the out-of-court oral statement of the voter, not only
is the veracity of the voter suspect, but so potentially too is that of the
witness recounting the voter's statement. To the extent that what is at issue
in the underlying case is the outcome of a contested election, and to the
extent that the witness has an interest in its outcome, her testimony
regarding the voter's statement is suspect for the same reasons delineated
above for testimony by the voter herself in such a proceeding.
B. The Interest in Ballot Secrecy
As detailed above, the concept of a secret ballot was foreign to the
common law and appeared nowhere in the United States prior to 1888.211
Because the absence of a secret ballot led to rampant instances of vote
buying and voter coercion, toward the tail end of the nineteenth century
nearly all states adopted the secret ballot.212 Indeed, numerous states
ensconced the right to a secret ballot within their constitutions.1 3 As will
be demonstrated in Part III, many states implied from the statutory and
constitutional rights to vote by secret ballot a corollary right of voters not to
208. See Briscoe v. Between Consol. Sch. Dist., 156 S.E. 654, 656 (Ga. 1931); Whatley v. La
Salle Par. Sch. Bd., 99 So. 603, 604 (La. 1924); Pennington v. Hare, 62 N.W. 116, 117 (Minn. 1895);
Martin v. McGarr, 117 P. 323, 328 (Okla. 1910); cf Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975) (distinguishing between private causes of action for securities fraud under Rule 1 Ob-5 by an
actual purchaser misled by a prospectus and a potential purchaser that was dissuaded by a misleading
prospectus).
209. See generally FED. R. EVD. advisory committee's introductory note to article VIII.
210. See Lauer v. Estes, 53 P. 262, 263 (Cal. 1898); City of Beardstown v. City of Virginia, 76
Ill. 34, 47-48 (1875).
211. See sources cited supra note 49.
212. See sources cited supra notes 46-50.
213. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. II, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
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be compelled to disclose the tenor of their votes in judicial proceedings.214
In addition, a number of states separately codified such a privilege.215
In recognizing such a privilege, courts in these states focused on both
the individual and societal interests furthered by protecting ballot
secrecy. 21 6 Thus, not only does it protect the privacy interests of the
individual voter-allowing her to vote without the risk of later being
subjected to "a kind of inquisitorial power unknown to the principles of our
government and constitution" 2'7-but it also protects the societal interest in
ensuring that elections are the result of the free exercise of the franchise
without the presence of voter intimidation and bribery.218
If secrecy in voting is limited to the point in time when the ballot is
cast and not extended to encompass post-election inquiries, one of several
things might happen that will undermine this societal interest. First, when a
voter is asked to testify to the tenor of her vote, she may testify falsely
because she does not want to disclose to those who may have bribed or
pressured her to vote in a particular way that she actually exercised her
franchise freely, thus raising the trustworthiness concerns set forth
above. 219 Second, knowing that she may later be forced to disclose her vote
in judicial proceedings and not wishing to perjure herself, she may not
exercise her franchise freely-instead voting consistent with the pressures
brought to bear on her-or she might opt not to cast a ballot at all, any of
which would undermine the societal interest in free exercise of the
franchise.
Thus, where what is at issue is not anonymous electoral evidence-
such as an ambiguously marked paper ballot that the court is asked to
interpret-but rather electoral evidence regarding the tenor of a specific
individual's vote, admitting it in judicial proceedings undermines the right
214. See infra note 237.
215. See infra note 235.
216. See infra note 218.
217. See D'Aurizio v. Borough of Palisades Park, 899 F. Supp. 1352, 1358-59 (D.N.J. 1995).
218. See id; N.D. R. EvID. 506 explanatory note; McCavitt v. Registrars of Voters, 434 N.E.2d
620, 631 (Mass. 1982); People ex rel. Williams v. Cicott, 16 Mich. 283, 313-14 (1868) (opinion of
Campbell, J.); In re Zupsic, 670 A.2d 629, 639 (Pa. 1996); In re Orsatti, 598 A.2d 1341, 1343-44 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991).
219. See McCavitt, 434 N.E.2d at 631; Carabajal v. Lucero, 158 P. 1088, 1092-93 (N.M. 1916).
220. See D'Aurizio, 899 F. Supp. at 1358-59; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2214, at 162-63
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Critics of the instrumental justification for the privilege assume that the
only risk of not recognizing it is the possibility that some timid individuals might be dissuaded from
voting, a risk they perceive as far-fetched. See KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 26 FED. PRAC. & PROC.
EVD. § 5632 (lst ed. 2016). Yet, as demonstrated in Parts II.A and IIB, there also exists the risk that
the person will participate in the election, but the trustworthiness of her testimony will be tainted as a
result of the same external pressures that might dissuade some timid individuals from voting in the first
instance.
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to ballot secrecy which in turn undermines the societal interest in free
exercise of the franchise.
C. The Misuse of Electoral Evidence
As indicated above, the relevance of electoral evidence is greatest
when offered in judicial contests over the very election itself. For example,
if two candidates received exactly the same number of votes in an election
and there was one person who voted illegally, her testimony regarding the
tenor of her vote is not only relevant but-if believed by the trier of fact-
seemingly decisive of the outcome of the election. Yet, it is exactly in such
a setting that one of the risks associated with electoral evidence-its
trustworthiness-is at its peak.
When instead electoral evidence is offered for some other substantive
purpose-such as to show discriminatory intent in a civil or criminal case,
or to impeach a witness or a potential juror for bias against a party-the
risk of trustworthiness is reduced somewhat since the voter's testimony
will not impact the outcome of the election in which she voted. Yet,
electoral evidence is far less probative when offered for such purposes than
it is when offered to help determine the outcome of a specific election,
since the evidence is open to different inferences. As a result, any increase
in the trustworthiness of electoral evidence when offered outside of
election contests is offset by the risk that the evidence may be misused or
overvalued by the trier of fact.
For example, a person who votes against same-sex marriage may
harbor general anti-gay bias, or she might simply have specific religious or
other beliefs regarding marriage that color her view on that specific
221issue. Similarly, a person who voted in favor of a state constitutional
amendment to prohibit race-based affirmative action in public universities
may harbor general bias against racial minorities, or she may simply have a
philosophical objection to the practice of affirmative action.2 22 Suppose,
however, that the person is sued by two employees--one gay and one
African-American-for allegedly discriminatory employment actions.
Under the liberal theory of relevancy embodied in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, evidence regarding the tenor of the person's votes on those two
ballot initiatives is presumptively admissible to prove-but hardly
compelling or even persuasive evidence of-her alleged discriminatory
mindset toward gays and African-Americans. Yet, there is a risk that jurors
221. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); id at 2718 (Alito, J., dissenting).
222. See generally Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1634-38
(2014).
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will make a measurement error in weighing its probative value, giving it
undue weight, so much so that it might crowd out other, more direct
evidence of what happened in the case. 3 Alternatively, there is a risk that
jurors will intentionally misuse the electoral evidence, using it to punish a
party who in their minds voted the "wrong way" on a sensitive political
issue or in a particularly polarizing electoral race.224
Finally, there is a risk that merely countenancing the admission of how
parties, witnesses, and potential jurors voted in elections to make somewhat
far-fetched claims of bias sends a normalizing message to the public that
one's political preferences should bias judicial proceedings. Thus, while
not issuing a blanket rejection of its use, the U.S. Supreme Court has
cautioned against the free admission of a witness's political leanings vis-A-
vis those of a party, reasoning that "[t]he public should not be taught, by
the mode in which trials of this character are conducted, that the
prosecution of a crime... will be regarded by the court as, in effect, a
prosecution of a political party to which the accused belongs. 225
III. ELECTORAL EVIDENCE AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
Although relevant and thus presumptively admissible in a variety of
circumstances, electoral evidence carries with it a number of risks,
including its lack of trustworthiness, its undermining of the right to cast a
secret ballot, and the risk that it will be overvalued or misused by the trier
of fact. Unlike some other categories of evidence that are excluded due to
the risk of being overvalued or misused and for other policy reasons-such
as evidence of a sexual assault victim's other sexual behavior 226 or
evidence of subsequent remedial measures 22 7-there is no single rule that
addresses the admissibility of electoral evidence in a comprehensive
fashion.
Instead, a number of discrete evidentiary rules of general application
serve as potential roadblocks to admitting otherwise relevant electoral
evidence. Chief among these are two different types of privileges, both of
which are at least partially grounded in constitutional guarantees: the
political vote privilege, which protects against disclosure of lawfully cast
223. See NICOLAS, supra note 95, at 35-36 n.6.
224. Cf Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180-81 (1997).
225. See Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 415 (1895); cf Peter Nicolas, "They Say He's
Gay": The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual Orientation, 37 GA. L. REV. 793, 848-49 (2003)
(contending that the very act of deeming evidence of a person's sexual orientation to be relevant for far-
fetched purposes legitimizes a stigmatizing message about gays and lesbians).
226. See FED. R. EVID. 412.
227. See FED. R. EVID. 407.
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votes, 228 and the privilege against self-incrimination, which protects against
disclosure of unlawfully cast votes.229 Other evidentiary bases for
excluding electoral evidence include the rule against hearsay, 230 the best
evidence rule,231 and exclusion on the grounds of unfair prejudice.23 2
Collectively, these individual evidentiary principles address, in piecemeal
fashion, the dangers associated with admitting electoral evidence.233 Yet, a
variety of gaps contained in each of these doctrines-including their
limited scope, the numerous exceptions to the privileges, the rule against
hearsay, the best evidence rule, and the inconsistent and unpredictable
application of the rule excluding evidence on the ground of unfair
prejudice-mean that unreliable electoral evidence can still make its way
before the trier of fact.
A. State "Political Vote" Privileges
As detailed in Part I, in response to rampant instances of vote buying
and coercion, states in the late nineteenth century revised their election
apparatuses to ensure that voting was by secret ballot.234 In some states, the
right to vote by secret ballot was protected solely by legislative act,235 while
in others, the right was more robustly protected via provisions ensconced
into the states' constitutions.236
Relying in some instances on such statutory and constitutional
provisions and in other instances on general principles of common law,
courts in over half of the states eventually recognized a privilege allowing
voters to refuse in judicial proceedings to disclose the tenor of their votes
cast via secret ballot in political elections.237 These courts viewed the
228. See, e.g., ALA. R. EvID. 506(b); Taylor v. Pile, 391 P.2d 670, 673 (Colo. 1964).
229. See, e.g., Montoya v. Ortiz, 175 P. 335, 337-38 (N.M. 1918); Oliphint v. Christy, 299
S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tex. 1957).
230. See FED. R. EvID. 802; Lauer v. Estes, 53 P. 262, 263 (Cal. 1898); City of Beardstown v.
City of Virginia, 76 111. 34, 47 (1875).
231. See FED. R. EvID. 1002; Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 607-08 (Il1. 1990); Helm v.
State Election Bd., 589 P.2d 224, 234 (Okla. 1979).
232. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
233. Although evidentiary objections are raised relatively infrequently during the jury selection
process, strictly speaking, the Federal Rules of Evidence and their state law counterparts are applicable
in such proceedings. See Thomas v. Hardwick, 231 P.3d 1111, 1113-14, 1114 n.4 (Nev. 2010); Watson
v. State, 917 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Tex. App. 1996); TED A. DONNER & RICHARD K. GABRIEL, JURY
SELECTION STRATEGY AND SCIENCE § 18:1 (3d ed. 2016).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 39-52.
235. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Simpson, 350 So. 2d 998, 1010 (Miss. 1977); Lane v. Bailey, 75 P. 191,
195-96 (Mont. 1904).
236. See, e.g., Bush v. Head, 97 P. 512, 514-15 (Cal. 1908); State v. Matlack, 64 A. 259, 265
(Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1905).
237. See Black v. Pate, 30 So. 434, 439 (Ala. 1901); Willis v. Crumbly, 268 S.W.3d 288, 296
(Ark. 2007); Bush, 97 P. at 514-15; Taylor v. Pile, 391 P.2d 670, 673 (Colo. 1964); Matlack, 64 A. at
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privilege as a necessary corollary to the compulsory secret ballot, which in
turn they characterized as designed to ensure the elector's vote will reflect
238her true preference and not be the result of undue influence.
Today, twenty U.S. states and two U.S. territories, by statute or
codified rule of evidence, recognize such a political vote privilege.
23 9
Another twenty-one states have judicial decisions on the books recognizing
such a privilege,240  all (or nearly all) of which have survived the
codification of rules of evidence in those states.24 1 Of the remaining nine
265; Taggart v. Phillips, 249 S.E.2d 245, 246 (Ga. 1978); Pedigo v. Grimes, 13 N.E. 700, 701 (Ind.
1887); Powers v. Harten, 167 N.W. 693, 695 (Iowa 1918); Wood v. Kirby, 566 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Ky.
1978); Gainnie v. Druilhet, 79 So. 212, 213 (La. 1918); McCavitt v. Registrars of Voters, 434 N.E.2d
620, 629-31 (Mass. 1982); In re Opinion of the Justices, 126 A. 354, 367 (Me. 1924); Belcher v. Mayor
of Ann Arbor, 262 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Mich. 1978); Ganske v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 136 N.W.2d 405, 408
(Minn. 1965); O'Neal, 350 So.2d at 1010; Montgomery v. Dormer, 79 S.W. 913, 915-16 (Mo. 1904);
Lane, 75 P. at 195-96; Dean v. Miller, 76 N.W. 555, 556 (Neb. 1898); Kiehne v. Atwood, 604 P.2d
123, 126-27 (N.M. 1979) (citing N.M. CONST., art. VII, § 1); Longo v. D'Apice, 546 N.Y.S.2d 907,
908 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); People ex rel. Boyer v. Teague, 11 S.E. 665, 679-81 (N.C. 1890);
Torkelson v. Byrne, 276 N.W. 134, 138 (N.D. 1937); In re Sugar Creek Local Sch. Dist., 185 N.E.2d
809, 815 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pls. 1962); State ex rel. Heath v. Kraft, 23 P. 663, 665 (Or. 1890); In re
Orsatti, 598 A.2d 1341, 1343-44 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991); Horton v. Sullivan, 86 A. 314, 315 (R.I.
1913); Abbott v. Hunhoff, 491 N.W.2d 450, 453 (S.D. 1992); Moore v. Sharp, 41 S.W. 587, 589 (Tenn.
1897); Oliphint v. Christy, 299 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tex. 1957); Maynard v. Hammond, 79 S.E.2d 295,
299 (W. Va. 1953); State ex rel. Doerflinger v. Hilmantel, 23 Wis. 422, 425-26 (1868); Fugate v.
Mayor of Buffalo, 348 P.2d 76, 85-86 (Wyo. 1959); see also Granados v. Rodriguez Estrada I, 124
D.P.R. 1, 38 (P.R. 1989).
238. See Black, 30 So. at 439; Teague, 11 S.E. at 679; Van Winkle v. Crabtree, 55 P. 831, 835
(Or. 1899); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2214, at 162-63 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
239. See LA. CODE EVID. art. 512 (1992); 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2507(A) (1978); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-506 (1979); TEX. R. EvID. 506; WISC. STAT. ANN. § 905.07 (West 1974); see
also ALA. R. EvID. 506(a); ARK. R. EVID. 506(a); ARK. R. EVID. 507; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1050 (1965);
DEL. R. EVID. 506(a); HAW. R. EVID. 507; IDAHO R. EVID. 506(a); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-
910 (1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-431 (1963); ME. R. EVID. 506(a); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-507
(1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.315 (1971); N.J. R. EVID. 513; N.M. R. EVID. 11-507; N.D. R. EVID.
506(a); P.R. STAT. tit. 32 § 29 (1979); V.I. CODE 5 § 857(a) (2011). In some of these states, the
privilege is dually protected by statute and by the state constitution. See, e.g., Abbott, 491 N.W.2d at
453 (S.D. 1992).
240. See Taylor, 391 P.2d at 673; Matlack, 64 A. at 265; Taggart, 249 S.E.2d at 246; Pedigo, 13
N.E. at 701; Powers, 167 N.W. at 695; Wood, 566 S.W.2d at 753; McCavitt, 434 N.E.2d at 629-31;
Belcher, 262 N.W.2d at 2; Ganske, 136 N.W.2d at 408; O'Neal, 350 So. 2d at 1010; Montgomery, 79
S.W. at 915-16; Lane, 75 P. at 195-96; Longo, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 908; Teague, 11 S.E. at 679-8 1; In re
Sugar Creek Local Sch. Dist., 185 N.E.2d at 815; Heath, 23 P. at 665; In re Orsatti, 598 A.2d at 1343-
44; Horton, 86 A. at 315; Moore, 41 S.W. at 589; Maynard, 79 S.E.2d at 299; Fugate, 348 P.2d at 85-
86.
241. Three of those states-Massachusetts, Missouri, and New York-have not codified their
rules of evidence, and so the common law continues to control. See proposed MASS. R. EVID.; proposed
MO. EviD. CODE; proposed N.Y. CODE OF EVID. Fourteen of those states have codified their rules of
evidence and have not specifically included a political vote privilege, but they have adopted a general
evidentiary rule recognizing common law privileges. See COLO. R. EVID. 501; CONN. CODE EVID. § 5-1;
IND. R. EVID. 501; IOWA R. EvID. 501; MICH. R. EVID. 501; MINN. R. EvtD. 501; N.C. R. EVID. 501;
OHIO R. EviD. 501; OR. R. EVID. 514; PA. R. EvID. 501; R.I. R. EVD. 501; TENN. R. EviD. 501; W. VA.
R. EVID. 501; WYO. R. EviD. 501. One of those states has codified its evidentiary privileges, but is silent
on whether that list of privileges is exclusive or whether common law privileges continue to be
recognized. See GA. STAT. § 24-5-501 (2014). The remaining three states have codified their evidentiary
privileges and indicated that the codified list is exclusive unless, inter alia, the state constitution
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states, courts in two, Arizona242 and Utah,243 have explicitly left the issue
open, while the other seven-Florida, Maryland, New Hampshire, South
Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington-have no cases or statutes
addressing the issue. However, seven of these nine states have
constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right to a secret ballot,244 and the
remaining two states have statutes guaranteeing the same245 from which
courts could derive a political vote privilege, in accordance with the many
other states that have done so.24 6 In addition, five of the nine states have a
rule acknowledging the power of courts to recognize common law
privileges that could similarly result in the recognition of such a
privilege.247 It thus seems likely that if the issue were addressed by courts
in the remaining states, the result would be unanimous (or nearly so)
recognition of the privilege nationwide.248
An analogous privilege likely exists at the federal level and governs
when federal causes of action are involved.249 When the Federal Rules of
Evidence were originally proposed, they included a series of specific
evidentiary privileges, including a political vote privilege with an exception
for illegally cast votes.2 50 In response to overwhelmingly negative criticism
of the specific privileges proposed to be included in and excluded from the
Federal Rules of Evidence-albeit none directed at the political vote
privilege itself-Congress substituted in their place a general rule directing
courts to determine the existence and scope of federal privileges by way of
"[t]he common law-as interpreted by United States courts in the light of
provides otherwise. See KY. R. EVID. 501; MISS. R. EvD. 501; MONT. R. EVID. 501. In one of those
three states, the courts have explicitly derived the privilege from the state constitution, see Wood v.
Kirby, 566 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Ky. 1978) (citing KY. CONST. § 147), and the other two states have
constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right to a secret ballot that could be similarly construed. See
MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 240; MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
242. See Huggins v. Superior Court, 788 P.2d 81, 84 (Ariz. 1990); Clay v. Town of Gilbert, 773
P.2d 233, 240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (Fidel, J., specially concurring).
243. See Cox v. Laycock, 345 P.3d 689, 697 n.28 (Utah 2015).
244. See ARiz. CONST. art. VII, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 1; MD. CONST. art. I, § 1; S.C.
CONST. art. II, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 8; VA. CONST. art. II, § 3; WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
245. See N.H. REv. STAT. § 659:37 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2504 (1977).
246. See supra note 237.
247. See ARIz. R. EVID. 501; S.C. R. EvID. 501; UTAH R. EVID. 501; VT. R. EVID. 501(a); VA.
SuP. CT. R. 2:501.
248. The remaining territories and the District of Columbia likewise have statutes and
constitutional provisions from which such a privilege could be derived, or a general rule empowering
courts to recognize common law privileges. See D.C. CODE § 1-1001.09(a) (2017); GUAM R. EVID. 501;
1 N. MAR. I. CODE § 6521 (2010).
249. When a state law cause of action is adjudicated in federal court, state privilege law governs.
See FED. R. EVID. 501.
250. See proposed FED. R. EvID. 507.
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reason and experience."25 1 Applying this standard, the only federal court to
consider the matter to date has recognized a federal common law political
vote privilege.252
The U.S. Supreme Court has identified several relevant factors in
deciding whether or not to recognize a federal privilege under this standard.
First, a court must assess the social benefits of recognizing the privilege
and weigh those against the impact of excluding the evidence on the truth-
seeking process. 253 Second, the court should determine the extent to which
the privilege has been adopted by the states, with the privilege more likely
to be recognized at the federal level if there is broad consensus for the
privilege at the state level. 4 Third, inclusion of the privilege in the original
draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence is a factor that weighs in favor of
recognizing a privilege at the federal level, since most of the proposed
privileges were restatements of the existing common law.255 These factors
all weigh in favor of recognition of a federal common law political vote
privilege. First, as demonstrated in Part II, the privilege furthers the
256important social interest in free and fair elections. Moreover, the cost of
the privilege is minimal, since the alternative is very often not truthful but
rather perjured testimony.257 Second, there is a broad consensus among the
states that such a privilege should exist, with at least forty-one states
recognizing the privilege and no state explicitly rejecting the privilege. 8
Finally, the privilege was included in the originally proposed draft of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 259 For all of these reasons, it seems likely that if
confronted with the question, other lower federal courts and the U.S.
Supreme Court would likely recognize a federal common law political vote
privilege.260
251. See FED. R. EvID. 501; Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual
Synthesis, 73 NEB. L. REV. 511,512-15,532-33 (1994).
252. See D'Aurizio v. Borough of Palisades Park, 899 F. Supp. 1352 (D.N.J. 1995).
253. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1996).
254. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12-13; Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-50 (1980);
United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368 n.8 (1980).
255. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 14-15; Gillock, 445 U.S. at 367-68.
256. SeeD'Aurizio, 899 F. Supp. at 1358-59.
257. Cf Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11-12 (holding that absent a psychotherapist-patient privilege,
conversations between patients and their psychotherapists would be chilled, and thus refusing to
recognize privilege would not result in evidence that would aid the truth-seeking process); In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 603 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that the alternative to recognizing
marital communications privilege may be perjured testimony).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 237-47; D"Aurizio, 899 F. Supp. at 1356-58.
259. SeeD'Aurizio, 899 F. Supp. at 1356.
260. Whether the privilege is separately grounded in the U.S. Constitution is a complex question
that lower courts have left open. In contrast with state constitutions, the U.S. Constitution does not in
terms refer to a right to a secret ballot. See Smith v. Dunn, 381 F. Supp. 822, 825 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
However, the right to a secret ballot and the corollary right not to disclose the tenor of one's vote may
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By recognizing a political vote privilege, these jurisdictions have taken
a significant step in addressing the three risks associated with electoral
evidence identified in Part II. First, the privilege calls for the exclusion of
perhaps the most untrustworthy form of electoral evidence-testimony by
the voter herself. Second, the very rationale many courts and policy makers
invoke for recognizing the privilege-furthering the right to vote by secret
ballot-assures that the individual and societal interests served by ballot
secrecy are not undermined. Third, by presumptively excluding such
testimony, the privilege assures that at least this form of electoral evidence
is not misused or overvalued by the trier of fact.
Yet, within the jurisdictions that have recognized the political vote
privilege by statute or judicial decision, there are generally three
recognized exceptions to the privilege. First, virtually every jurisdiction
extends the privilege only to legal voters, holding that those who
participated in the election illegally are not entitled to invoke the
privilege.26 1 Second, most jurisdictions permit the voter herself to waive the
be derivative of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of association, or it might be recognized
as an unenumerated right under the doctrine of substantive due process. See Anderson v. Mills, 664
F.2d 600, 608 (6th Cir. 1981); D'Aurizio, 899 F. Supp. at 1359 n.5; Libertarian Party of Tenn. v. Goins,
793 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1082-85 (M.D. Tenn. 2010). Those jurists who view historical practice as
decisive in interpreting the U.S. Constitution conclude that our nation's long history without a secret
ballot means that the right to so vote-and in turn any corollary right not to disclose the tenor of one's
vote-is not constitutionally mandated. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 224-27 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Socialist Workers Party v. Hechler, 890 F.2d 1303, 1308 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989); Barsky v.
United States, 167 F.2d 241, 249 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1948); see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2659, 2676 n.27 (2015) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I § 4 cl. 1)
(noting that the framers of the U.S. Constitution left the choice of whether to vote by secret ballot or not
to the states). In contrast, those Justices who view the Constitution more fluidly have suggested
otherwise. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("It
cannot require argument that inquiry would be barred to ascertain whether a citizen had voted for one or
the other of the two major parties either in a state or national election .... This is so, even though
adequate protection of secrecy by way of the Australian ballot did not come into use till 1888. The
implications of the United States Constitution for national elections and 'the concept of ordered liberty'
implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as against the States ... were not
frozen as of 1789 or 1868, respectively."); Am. Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 419 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003) (declaring that
"[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due
process inquiry" and indicating that recent legal developments in the states are relevant); G.A. Res. 217
(III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21(3) (Dec. 10, 1948) (recognizing a right to vote
by secret ballot).
261. See ALA. R. EviD. 506(b); ALASKA. R. EVID. 507; ARK. R. EVID. 506(b); CAL. EvID. CODE
§ 1050 (1965); DEL. R. EvID. 506(b); HAW. R. EVID. 507; IDAHO R. EvtD. 506(b); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-431 (1963); LA. STAT. ANN.-C.E. ART. 512; ME. R. EvtD. 506(b)(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-507
(1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.315 (1971); N.J. R. EVID. 513; N.M. R. EVID. 11-507; N.D. R. EvID.
506(b); 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 2507(B) (West 1936); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, app. IV § 29
(1954); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-506 (1967); TEx. R. EVID. 506; 5 V.I. CODE § 857(b) (2011);
WISC. STAT. ANN. § 905.07; D'Aurizio, 899 F. Supp. at 1361; Taylor v. Pile, 391 P.2d 670, 673 (Colo.
1964); Mansfield v. Scully, 29 A.2d 444, 449 (Conn. 1942); Pedigo v. Grimes, 13 N.E. 700, 701 (Ind.
1887); Tunks v. Vincent, 51 S.W. 622, 624 (Ky. 1899); McCavitt v. Registrars of Voters, 434 N.E.2d
620, 630 (Mass. 1982); Belcher v. Mayor of Ann Arbor, 262 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Mich. 1978); Ganske v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 136 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Minn. 1965); O'Neal v. Simpson, 350 So. 2d 998,
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privilege either expressly at trial or through her conduct prior to trial.262
Finally, a handful of jurisdictions have created an exception to the privilege
when disclosure is compellable pursuant to state election laws.263 Each of
these exceptions, while accompanied by reasoned justifications, has the
effect of reintroducing, at least in part, the dangers associated with electoral
evidence.
In deeming the political vote privilege inapplicable to illegal voters, 26
courts reason that since the purpose of the privilege is to maintain the
purity of the ballot box by ensuring that people cast their votes unimpeded
by improper influences calculated to thwart the free exercise of the
franchise, that policy would not be furthered-and indeed would be
undermined-were it to be invoked to shield efforts by dishonest people to
defeat the will of the people by voting illegally. 265 Indeed, allowing it to be
invoked under those circumstances, they reason, would tend to promote
fraud and encourage corruption.266 Jurisdictions split on how they define
illegality, with some narrowly defining it to include only situations in
which the voter acted in bad faith and not when the illegality of her vote
267was due, say, to a good faith mistake on her part, while other
1010-11 (Miss. 1977); Montgomery v. Dormer, 79 S.W. 913, 915-16 (Mo. 1904); Longo v. D'Apice,
546 N.Y.S.2d 907, 908 (App. Div. 1989); People ex rel. Boyer v. Teague, 11 S.E. 665, 679 (N.C.
1890); In re Sugar Creek Local Sch. Dist., 185 N.E.2d 809, 815 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pls. 1962); State ex rel.
Heath v. Kraft, 23 P. 663, 665 (Or. 1890); Horton v. Sullivan, 86 A. 314, 315 (R.I. 1913); Moore v.
Sharp, 41 S.W. 587, 589 (Tenn. 1897); Fugate v. Mayor of Buffalo, 348 P.2d 76, 85-86 (Wyo. 1959).
262. See ALA. R. EVID. 510(a); ALASKA R. EvtD. 510; ARK. R. EviD. 510; CAL. EvID. CODE §
1050 (1965); DEL. R. EvID. 510; HAW. R. Ev1D. 511; IDAHO R. EvID. 510; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-437
(1963); LA. STAT. ANN. C.E. ART. 502(A); ME. R. EVID. 510; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-511 (1975); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 49.385 (1971); N.J. R. EvIl. 530; N.M. R. EVID. 11-511; N.D. R. EVID. 510; 12 OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2511 (West 1936); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, app. IV, § 33, 34; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 19-19-510 (1967); 5 V.I. CODE § 861 (2011); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 905.11; N.D. R. EVID. 506,
explanatory note; TEX. R. EvID. 511; Lane v. Bailey, 75 P. 191, 195-96 (Mont. 1904); Longo, 546
N.Y.S.2d at 908; Teague, 11 S.E. at 679; Helm v. State Election Bd., 589 P.2d 224, 234 (Okla. 1979);
Kraft, 23 P. at 665; Wood v. State ex rel. Lee, 126 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tex. 1939); Fugate, 348 P.2d at 85-86;
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2214, at 164 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); cf Ctr. Partners, Ltd. v. Growth
Head GP, LLC, 981 N.E.2d 345, 356-57 (Ill. 2012) (attorney-client privilege).
263. See ALA. R. EVID. 506(b); ARK. R. EVID. 506(b); DEL. R. EVID. 506(b); IDAHO R. EVID.
506(b); ME. R. EvID. 506(b)(2); N.D. R. EVID. 506(b); S.D. COD. L. § 19-19-506; 5 V.I. CODE § 857(b).
264. Whether someone voted illegally is a preliminary question of fact for the court to decide in
determining the applicability of the privilege. See Black v. Pate, 30 So. 434, 439 (Ala. 1901). In the face
of uncertainty, a presumption that the person voted legally-and thus that the privilege is applicable-
typically governs. See id; In re Levens, 702 P.2d 320, 325 (Kan. 1985).
265. See Black v. Pate, 30 So. 434, 439 (Ala. 1901); Mansfield, 29 A.2d at 449; Buckingham v.
Angell, 87 N.E. 285, 286 (Il. 1909); McCavitt, 434 N.E.2d at 630; Van Winkle v. Crabtree, 55 P. 831,
835 (Or. 1899); Abbott v. Hunhoff, 491 N.W.2d 450, 453 (S.D. 1992); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2214, at 163 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
266. See Willis v. Crumbly, 268 S.W.3d 288, 296-97 (Ark. 2007); Montoya v. Ortiz, 175 P. 335,
338 (N.M. 1918); Teague, 11 S.E. at 679; Kraft, 23 P. at 665; Tunks, 51 S.W. at 624; Horton, 86 A. at
315.
267. See Huggins v. Superior Court, 788 P.2d 81, 84 (Ariz. 1990); Mahaffey v. Barnhill, 855
P.2d 847, 850-51 (Colo. 1993) (en banc); McCavitt, 434 N.E.2d at 630-31; Belcher, 262 N.W.2d at 2.
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jurisdictions define it broadly to include even situations in which the
individual inadvertently voted unlawfully.268
Yet while these courts are undoubtedly correct that the exception for
illegally cast votes does little to undermine the purposes behind ballot
secrecy laws,269 the exception still risks the admission of untrustworthy
testimony. Indeed, to the extent that who is involved is an illegal voter in
the narrow sense of having acted with evil intent, the risks that she will
testify falsely in an effort to further disrupt the outcome of the election are
even more pronounced. 270 Nor is such an exception necessary for courts to
resolve election contests in which illegal votes were cast. One state,
Illinois, lacks an exception for illegal voters.271 When illegal votes are
determined to have been cast, courts in that state instead look to
circumstantial evidence-such as the party affiliation of the individuals at
issue-as a way to determine how they likely voted when eliminating their
illegal votes, or if the circumstantial evidence is inconclusive, courts throw
out the election, or at least the vote in a given precinct.272 Excluding the
compelled testimony of the illegal voters does not undermine the goal of
accurately determining the outcome of such elections because the evidence
that would otherwise be compelled would likely be untrustworthy and thus
might even undermine that goal.273
As for the exception to the privilege allowing the voter herself to waive
the privilege and testify, courts characterize the privilege as personal274 to
the voter275 and reason that while allowing her to invoke it fully effectuates
268. See Van Winkle, 55 P. at 835; In re Campbell, 15 Pa. D. 607, 608 (Pa. Ct. Quarter Sess.
1905); State ex rel. Doerflinger v. Hilmantel, 23 Wis. 422, 425-26 (1868).
269. In those jurisdictions that define illegal voter broadly to encompass those who acted in good
faith, the exception also to some extent undermines the purposes behind ballot secrecy laws.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 199-200.
271. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-910 (1986); Gribble v. Willeford, 546 N.E.2d 994,
999 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
272. See Gribble, 546 N.E.2d at 999.
273. See id. One treatise describes the political vote privilege as a "phantom" one, reasoning that
the testimony covered by it is only relevant in cases involving illegal voters, in which case this
exception applies. See GRAHAM, supra note 220. Yet, as demonstrated above, this limited view of the
relevance of electoral evidence is incorrect, even within the context of election contests.
274. Because the privilege is personal to the voter, in a case in which a question is asked of a
prospective juror or a non-party witness (such as a voter in a case involving a dispute between two
political candidates), the privilege can only be invoked by the voter herself, not the parties to the action.
See N.D. R. EvID. 506 explanatory note; Dennis v. Chilton County, 68 So. 889, 890 (Ala. 1915); People
v. Ochoa, 966 P.2d 442, 488 (Cal. 1998); Eggers v. Fox, 52 N.E. 269, 270 (Ill. 1898); State ex reL Beu
v. Lockwood, 165 N.W. 330, 333 (Iowa 1917); Kiehne v. Atwood, 604 P.2d 123, 128 (N.M. 1979);
Torkelson v. Byrne, 276 N.W. 134, 138-40 (N.D. 1937); Wickham v. Coyner, 20 Ohio C.D. 765, 774
(Ohio Cir. Ct. 1900); State ex rel. Heath v. Kraft, 23 P. 663, 665 (Or. 1890); Ex parte Henry, 126
S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. 1939); State ex rel. Hopkins v. Olin, 23 Wis. 309, 319 (1868).
275. See Black v. Pate, 30 So. 434, 439 (Ala. 1901); State v. Matlack, 64 A. 259, 265 (Del. Ct.
Gen. Sess. 1905); Strebin v. Lavengood, 71 N.E. 494, 499 (Ind. 1904); Lockwood, 165 N.W. at 333;
Kiehne, 604 P.2d at 127-28; Torkelson, 276 N.W. at 138; Helm v. State Election Bd., 589 P.2d 224,
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her right to exercise a secret ballot, her voluntary testimony furthers the
competing societal interest in accurately resolving contested election
disputes.276 However, courts in some jurisdictions have declined to give
voters the power to waive the privilege.2 77 These courts recognize that
allowing such waivers potentially undermines the court's ability to
accurately resolve the dispute. In addition to the risks that the voluntary
testimony will be untrustworthy because the voter's personal interest in the
outcome of the election may cause her to fabricate her testimony or
because she will be pressured by her employer or associates to testify in a
particular way,278 if only some voters volunteer to testify but not others, the
testimony-even if truthful-may present the court with a distorted view of
the electorate's preferences. 279 These courts also recognize a variety of
ways in which voluntary individual waiver undermines the interest in ballot
secrecy. First, they question whether the waiver is truly voluntary,
reasoning that once it is known that waiver is possible, voters can be bribed
or intimidated by those with an interest in the outcome to exercise the
waiver.280 Second, they characterize the interest as not an individual but
rather a societal one in safeguarding the integrity of elections, and thus do
not view the individual voter as empowered to waive it.281 Third, even if
viewed as an individual right, when what is involved is a small precinct in
which, say, all but one voter have voluntarily waived their right to ballot
secrecy and disclosed the tenor of their votes, that testimony-when
coupled with the known results-is tantamount to forcibly waiving the
individual right of the remaining voter.282
Finally, a handful of jurisdictions include an exception to the privilege
that applies when disclosure is compellable pursuant to the state's election
laws.283 Recognition of the privilege in conjunction with this exception to
some extent addresses the third risk associated with electoral evidence,
232-33 (Okla. 1979); Kochersperger v. Hargrave, 6 Pa. C. 510, 514 (Pa. Ct. Quarter Sess. 1888);
Kaufmann v. La Crosse City Bd. of Canvassers, 98 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Wis. 1959).
276. See, e.g., Lane v. Bailey, 75 P. 191, 195-96 (Mont. 1904). Such a scenario might occur
when, for example, a voting machine failed, or the ballots were accidentally lost or destroyed in a given
precinct. See, e.g., Dixon v. Orr, 4 S.W. 774, 776 (Ark. 1887).
277. See Wood v. Kirby, 566 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Ky. 1978); McCavitt v. Registrars of Voters, 434
N.E.2d 620, 630-31 (Mass. 1982); Gallegos v. Miera, 215 P. 968, 970-71 (N.M. 1923); In re Zupsic,
670 A.2d 629, 639 (Pa. 1996).
278. See McCavitt v. Registrars of Voters, 434 N.E.2d 620, 631 (Mass. 1982); Cambajal v.
Lucero, 158 P. 1088, 1092-93 (N.M. 1916).
279. See Kirby v. Wood, 558 S.W.2d 180, 182 (Ky. 1977); accord Major v. Barker, 35 S.W.
543, 543-44 (Ky. 1896).
280. See In re Zupsic, 670 A.2d at 639; In re Orsatti, 598 A.2d 1341, 1343-44 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1991).
281. See McCavitt, 434 N.E.2d at 631.
282. See In re Gen. Election of Nov. 4, 1975, 71 Pa. D. & C.2d 83, 92-93 (Pa. Ct. Com. PI.
1975).
283. See sources cited supra note 256.
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because the net effect would be to compel the testimony only in those cases
in which it is highly probative-namely, election contests-and not when it
is offered for some marginally relevant purpose but carries a substantial
risk of being misused or overvalued by the trier of fact. However, as
demonstrated in Part II, the scenario in which electoral evidence is most
relevant, election contests, is also the scenario in which the risk of
untrustworthiness is likely at its zenith.
B. Other Evidentiary Bases for Excluding Electoral Evidence
The political vote privilege is perhaps one of the most significant
barriers to admitting electoral evidence. Yet, as demonstrated in Part
III.A.1, a number of commonly recognized exceptions to the privilege
result in the admission of electoral evidence that is untrustworthy,
undermines the right to a secret ballot, and is subject to the risk of being
misused or overvalued by the trier of fact. Moreover, separate and apart
from these concerns, the political vote privilege itself-even in the absence
of its exceptions-bars only the admission of one type of electoral
evidence, namely, testimony from the voter herself.2 84 It thus serves as no
barrier to admitting other types of electoral evidence that might possess
similar or greater risks, such as admitting the voter's out-of-court
statements regarding the tenor of her vote.
This Part considers a variety of other evidentiary principles that
together address some but not all categories of evidence left unaffected by
the political vote privilege. These include the privilege against self-
incrimination, the rule against hearsay, the best evidence rule, and
exclusion on the grounds of unfair prejudice.
1. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
As demonstrated above, virtually every jurisdiction in the United States
that has recognized a political vote privilege excepts from its scope those
who voted illegally in the election.285 As argued therein, compelling an
illegal voter to disclose the tenor of her vote introduces the risk that the
proceedings will be polluted with untrustworthy testimony. However, while
unprotected by the political vote privilege, an illegal voter can resist
compelled testimony regarding her illegal vote by invoking the privilege
against self-incrimination.
Because there are typically criminal sanctions associated with voting
illegally in an election, a voter can invoke the privilege against self-
284. See infra text accompanying notes 313-318.
285. See infra text accompanying note 288.
[Vol. 69:1:109
Electoral Evidence
incrimination to avoid answering questions regarding her participation in
the election.286 Yet, the scope of the privilege in this context is narrow in a
number of ways. First, as with the political vote privilege generally, the
privilege against self-incrimination is a personal one that can be waived by
the voter if she wishes to testify.28 7 Second, strictly speaking, the privilege
as a general rule protects only the fact of the person's illegal vote and not
the tenor of her vote. Thus, although she cannot be compelled to state
whether she voted or not, if she admits that she voted in the election, the
privilege against self-incrimination does not allow her to resist testifying as
to the tenor of her vote,288 save for the narrow circumstance in which the
tenor of one's vote is itself an element of a charged crime.289 Third, it is
possible that someone will be deemed to be an illegal voter-such that the
political vote privilege will be inapplicable-yet that her illegal
participation in the election was in good faith such that she lacks criminal
intent, in which case the privilege against self-incrimination likewise will
be inapplicable. 90 Fourth, an individual's act of voting may have been
unlawful, but state law may impose no criminal sanctions for the offense,
in which case the privilege against self-incrimination will likewise be
inapplicable. 29 1 Finally, a number of states have statutory or constitutional
provisions declaring that the privilege against self-incrimination cannot be
invoked by an illegal voter in a trial of a contested election, but avoid a
286. See LA. STAT. ANN.-C.E. art. 512 comment; ME. R. EVID. 506 advisers' note; Black v. Pate,
30 So. 434, 439 (Ala. 1901); Huggins v. Superior Court, 788 P.2d 81, 83 (Ariz. 1990); Exparte Senior,
19 So. 652, 657 (Fla. 1896); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 59 N.E. 555, 556 (I11. 1901); Scholl v. Bell, 102
S.W. 248, 256 (Ky. 1907); Tunks v. Vincent, 51 S.W. 622, 624 (Ky. 1899); Wilkinson v. McGill, 64
A.2d 266, 273 (Md. 1949); Gardner v. Bd. of Sch. Dist. No. 6, 226 N.W. 895, 896 (Mich. 1929);
Ganske v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 136 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Minn. 1965); Hubbard v. McKey, 193 So. 2d
129, 131 (Miss. 1966); Harris v. Stewart, 193 So. 339, 344 (Miss. 1940); Kiehne v. Atwood, 604 P.2d
123, 128 (N.M. 1979); Montoya v. Ortiz, 175 P. 335, 338 (N.M. 1918); People ex rel. Boyer v. Teague,
11 S.E. 665, 679 (N.C. 1890); In re Sugar Creek Local Sch. Dist., 185 N.E.2d 809, 815-16 (Ohio
1962); Baggett v. State Election Bd., 501 P.2d 817, 825 (Okla. 1972) (Jackson, J., specially
concurring); Granados v. Rodriguez Estrada I, 124 D.P.R. 1, 38 (P.R. 1989); Moore v. Sharp, 41 S.W.
587, 589-90 (Tenn. 1897); Oliphint v. Christy, 299 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tex. 1957); State ex rel. Hopkins
v. Olin, 23 Wis. 309, 318 (1868).
287. See Sorenson, 59 N.E. at 556. Because it is personal to the individual illegal voter, it cannot
be invoked by another person, such as one of the two candidates in a contested election. See, e.g.,
Babnew v. Linneman, 740 P.2d 511, 515-16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Eggers v. Fox, 52 N.E. 269, 270
(Ill. 1898); Hanson v. Village of Adrian, 148 N.W. 276, 277 (Minn. 1914); Teague, 11 S.E. at 679-80.
288. See Babnew, 740 P.2d at 516; Eggers, 52 N.E. at 270; Powers v. Harten, 167 N.W. 693, 695
(Iowa 1918); Gardner, 226 N.W. at 896; Montoya, 175 P. at 338; In re Sugar Creek Local Sch. Dist.,
185 N.E.2d at 815-16; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2214, at 164 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
289. For example, if a person stands accused of being bribed or bribing someone to vote in a
particular way in the election, evidence regarding the tenor of her vote would be potentially
incriminating and thus encompassed by the privilege.
290. See Clay v. Town of Gilbert, 773 P.2d 233, 240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (Fidel, J., specially
concurring); Berg v. Veit, 162 N.W. 522, 523 (Minn. 1917); In re Sugar Creek Local Sch. Dist., 185
N.E.2d at 816.
291. See Vansant v. McPherson, 159 S.W. 630, 632 (Ky. 1913); Heitzman v. Voiers, 159 S.W.
625, 629 (Ky. 1913).
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constitutional infirmity by granting the voter immunity from prosecution
for the act of illegal voting.29 2 In sum, although the privilege against self-
incrimination plugs some of the holes created by the illegal voter exception
to the political vote privilege, for a variety of reasons, a voter's testimony
may not be protected by either privilege.
2. The Rule Against Hearsay
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence and their state law counterparts,
the general rule is that hearsay--defined as a person's out-of-court oral,
written, or nonverbal statement-is not admissible if offered into evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. 293 Thus, for
example, if Person A says to Person B when they run into each other at a
store, "I saw Person C shoot Person D," then unless an exception to the rule
against hearsay applies, Person B is barred from testifying to what Person
A said if it is offered in a judicial proceeding-such as an assault or murder
trial-to prove the fact that Person C shot Person D.
On the flip side, if a statement is offered for some reason other than to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement, it falls outside of the
definition of hearsay and thus is potentially admissible unless barred by
some other rule of evidence.2 94 Stated somewhat differently, "If the
significance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that it was made,
no issue is raised as to the truth of anything asserted, and the statement is
not hearsay. ' , 295 Thus, in the previous example, if there was a judicial
proceeding in which it was relevant to prove that Person A has the physical
ability to speak, or the ability to speak English, it would not be hearsay,
since it is not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement (that Person C shot Person D), but rather for some other
purpose. 296 Similarly, if the very uttering or writing of the out-of-court
statement is legally significant-such as words of defamation, contract, or
threats-they are treated as non-hearsay "verbal acts. 2 97 Furthermore, if a
witness has made an out-of-court written or oral statement and
subsequently gives testimony in court that is inconsistent with that prior
statement, the prior inconsistent statement is admissible for the non-hearsay
292. See Exparte Bullen, 181 So. 498, 500 (Ala. 1938); People v. Turpin, 112 P. 539, 542 (Colo.
1910); In re Second State Senatorial Election, 27 Phila. Co. Rptr. 68, 82-83 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1994);
Beauregaard v. Gunnison City, 160 P. 815, 816-18 (Utah 1916).
293. See FED. R. EvID. 801(a), (c); FED. R. EVID. 802.
294. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) advisory committee's note.
295. See id
296. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99, 102 (3d Cir. 1983).
297. See FED. R. EvID. 801(c) advisory committee's note; CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD
C. KIRKPATRICK, 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:18 (4th ed. 2017).
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29purpose of impeaching her credibility as a witness. 98 In that circumstance,
the out-of-court statement is not relevant for the truth of the matter asserted
therein, but rather for the fact that there is inconsistency between what the
witness says at one moment and what she says at another moment, and thus
sheds light on her credibility as a witness.299
At first glance, when a person gets on the stand and testifies that she
voted a particular way-or a third person testifies that she observed a
person mark her ballot in a particular way-there might appear to be a
hearsay problem. After all, voting often involves an out-of-court written
marking on some form of paper ballot that, in effect, is a written statement,
"I vote for Candidate X for Office Y." It would thus seem that whether the
testimony comes from the voter herself or a third person who observed her
mark the ballot, both involve reference to an out-of-court statement.
However, the act of voting, like the act of writing out and signing a
contract or making defamatory or threatening statements, is a verbal act, in
that the very writing of the words is legally significant.300 Thus, testimony
as to how the voter marked her ballot-whether conveyed via testimony
from the voter herself 3 1 or someone who observed her cast it30 2 is not
hearsay.
Similarly, if a voter gets on the stand and testifies that she voted for
Candidate A, evidence that she said or wrote out of court that she voted for
Candidate B would not necessarily be excluded as hearsay. Instead, it could
be admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of impeaching her credibility by
means of a prior inconsistent statement.30 3
But suppose that what is offered is instead evidence that Voter Z
asserted orally or in writing that she voted for a particular candidate, say by
telling her friend "I voted for Candidate X in yesterday's election," or
posting a similar statement on Facebook. 304 If such an out-of-court written
or oral statement is offered into evidence to prove the tenor of her vote,
say, in an election contest in which Voter Z is alleged to be an illegal voter,
298. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1); FED. R. EVID. 801(d) advisory committee's note; FED. R. EVID.
801 (d)(1)(A) advisory committee's note.
299. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 297, at § 8:19.
300. See Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers' Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 713 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137
(2002).
301. See Robinson v. McAbee, 222 P. 871, 874-75 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923); Wood v. Carroll
Cty. Election Comm'n, 1986 WL 5474, at *2 (Tenn. May 12, 1986) (citing Moore v. Sharp, 41 S.W.
587, 590 (Tenn. 1897)).
302. See Kennelly v. Gates, 406 S.W.2d 351, 356-57 (Tex. App. 1966).
303. See Smith v. Thomas, 54 P. 71, 71 (Cal. 1898).
304. A ballot selfie posted on social media without any text can constitute hearsay. See DAVID F.
BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK § 1:6, at 1-7 (4th ed. 2015) ("[I]t is possible for a photograph,
particularly one that is posed... to be hearsay. This is so if the photograph is assertive in nature, and is
offered to prove the truth of the assertion depicted.").
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it would be subject to exclusion on hearsay grounds because it is being
offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein,
namely, that she in fact voted for that particular candidate. °5 Under this
circumstance, the statement would be inadmissible unless it falls within an
exception to the hearsay rule.
Only one state-New Jersey-has a specific hearsay exception for
voter statements. Under that exception, if the voter is unavailable to testify,
her out-of-court statements regarding the tenor of her vote are
admissible. 30 6 Accordingly, when offered in federal proceedings or in any
other state, resort must be had to one of the general exceptions to or
exemptions from the hearsay rule.307 These various exceptions and
exemptions are recognized because of a belief that evidence falling within
them possesses sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to
justify dispensing with the hearsay rule in discrete circumstances.
The most likely applicable exception is that for an opposing party's
statement. A statement is not treated as hearsay if it is the statement of a
party to a proceeding and the statement is offered against that party.
309
Thus, for example, if a supervisor is sued for discriminating against an
employee because he is gay, the supervisor's out-of-court statements that
she voted in favor of one or more ballot initiatives that can be characterized
as anti-gay can be offered into evidence against her without violating the
hearsay rule.
Admitting hearsay statements becomes more challenging, however, in
cases in which a voter is not a formal party to a suit, such as in election
contests. In a handful of nineteenth and early twentieth century cases, some
courts held that a voter statement regarding the tenor of her vote should be
admissible as an opposing party's statement in election contests as well,
based on the fiction that the contending parties to the suit are not actually
305. See Lauer v. Estes, 53 P. 262, 263 (Cal. 1898); Lowe v. Weltner, 164 S.E.2d 919, 924 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1968); City of Beardstown v. City of Virginia, 76 Ill. 34, 47 (1875); Stewart v. Rose, 72 S.W.
271, 272 (Ky. 1903); Tunks v. Vincent, 51 S.W. 622, 624 (Ky. 1899); People ex rel Williams v. Cicott,
16 Mich. 283, 313 (1868) (opinion of Christiancy, J.); Dean v. Miller, 76 N.W. 555, 557 (Neb. 1898);
Moore v. Sharp, 41 S.W. 587, 590 (Tenn. 1897); Beauregaard v. Gunnison City, 160 P. 815, 820 (Utah
1916).
306. See N.J. R. EVID. 804(b)(7). The exception also encompasses statements regarding the
individual's qualifications to vote and the fact of their vote. See id.
307. The word "exemption" refers to those statements deemed "not hearsay" by Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d), while the word "exception" refers to those statements recognized as such by Federal
Rules of Evidence 803, 804, and 807. Molly D. McPartland, An Analysis of Facebook "Likes" and
Other Nonverbal Internet Communication Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 99 IOWA L. REV. 445,
457 n.93 (2013). The difference is a semantic rather than a practical one. See Sam Stonefield, Rule
801(d)'s Oxymoronic "Not Hearsay" Classification: The Untold Backstory and a Suggested
Amendment, 5 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 51-53 (2011).
308. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note; FED. R. EVID. 804(b) advisory
committee's note.
309. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
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the competing candidates but rather the challenged voters and the losing
candidate. 310  But most courts and commentators have rejected this
characterization, and thus this exception will ordinarily be unavailable
when a voter is not a formal party to a suit.311 Courts have also rejected
admitting such statements under the hearsay exception for statements
against interest, reasoning that without knowledge of how the voter actually
voted (and thus what her true interest is), it is impossible to characterize her
statements that she voted for a particular candidate as being for or against
her interest.3t 2
However, under narrow circumstances, at least six other exceptions to
and exemptions from the hearsay rule may pave the way to admitting a
voter's hearsay statements regarding the tenor of her vote in proceedings to
which she is not a party. First, if what is involved is not a backward-
looking statement recounting how the individual voted, but instead a
forward-looking statement regarding how she intends to vote, it would be
admissible as a statement of intent under the hearsay exception for state of
mind.313 Second, if a voter testifies that she voted a particular way, and she
has previously testified inconsistently under penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition, the latter would be
admissible under the hearsay exemption for prior inconsistent
statements.31 4 Third, if a voter testifies that she voted a particular way, and
her credibility is attacked by, for example, suggesting that her testimony is
tainted by a recent improper influence or motive, her prior out-of-court
statements that are consistent with her in-court testimony are admissible
under the exemption for prior consistent statements.315 Fourth, if a
testifying voter is asked how she voted in an election and she cannot recall,
her earlier recorded recollection of how she voted can be read into evidence
under the hearsay exception for recorded recollections.31 6 Fifth, if the voter
is unavailable to testify as a witness, but she previously gave testimony as a
310. See People ex rel. Smith v. Pease, 27 N.Y. 45, 52, 59-60 (1863) (Davies, J.); State ex rel.
Hallam v. Lally, 114 N.W. 447, 448 (Wis. 1908); State ex rel. Hopkins v. Olin, 23 Wis. 309, 319
(1868); CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 2318, 2321 (1858).
311. See Lauer v. Estes, 53 P. 262, 264 (Cal. 1898); City of Beardstown v. City of Virginia, 76
Ill. 34, 47-48 (Ill. 1875); Gilleland v. Schuyler, 9 Kan. 569, 582-84 (1872); Dean v. Miller, 76 N.W.
555, 557 (Neb. 1898); Hill v. Howell, 127 P. 211, 215 (Wash. 1912); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§
1712, 1713, at 82, 86 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
312. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1712, 1713, at 82, 86 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)
313. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3); Moore v. Sharp, 41 S.W. 587, 590 (Tenn. 1897); 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 1713, 1725, at 87, 129-39 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); see generally Shepard v. United
States, 290 U.S. 96, 105-06 (1933).
314. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
315. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(B).
316. See FED. R. EVID. 803(5). The voter would need to testify that the recorded recollection was
made when her memory regarding the tenor of her vote was fresh and that it was accurately recorded
when made. See id.
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witness at a trial, hearing, or deposition regarding the tenor of her vote, that
testimony can be offered against a party who had an opportunity and
similar motive to develop the testimony in the earlier proceeding. 317 Sixth,
if the voter made a statement regarding the tenor of her vote at the very
moment she was voting or immediately thereafter-such as by posting the
tenor of her vote on social media by way of a ballot selfie or otherwise-
that statement could be admitted as a present sense impression.
318
In sum, although the hearsay rule presents a modest barrier to the
admission of certain types of electoral evidence, its impact is limited for
two reasons. First, because the definition of hearsay is narrow, a variety of
different types of electoral evidence are unaffected by the hearsay rule.
And second, there are numerous exceptions to and exemptions from the
hearsay rule that, at least under certain factual circumstances, pave the way
to admitting even those types of electoral evidence that meet the definition
of hearsay.
3. The "Best Evidence" Rule
As demonstrated in Part II.B.2, when an effort is made to prove the
tenor of someone's vote by means of the voter's own testimony or the
testimony of a third party who observed her casting her vote, the proffered
testimony does not violate the hearsay rule. Even though the testimony
references an out-of-court written statement-the ballot-the testimony is
not offered to prove the truth of any matter asserted in the ballot, but
merely the fact that the statement was made therein.
However, separate and apart from a hearsay objection to testimony
about the content of a written document such as a marked ballot is a best
evidence objection to such testimony. Under the best evidence rule, unless
an exception applies, the original of a writing-as contrasted with
testimony about the writing's content or a copy of the writing-is required
in order to prove the writing's content.319 Thus, proving the content of a
marked ballot by means of a voter's own testimony or the testimony of a
third person who watched her cast it would ordinarily violate the best
evidence rule.32°
The reason that the best evidence rule might demand the exclusion of
testimony regarding the content of an out-of-court writing even when the
317. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
318. See FED. R. EvID. 803(1). If none of these specific exceptions and exemptions apply, a party
can invoke the residual exception, which empowers a court to admit hearsay statements not covered by
any codified exception but that have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. See FED.
R. EviD. 807.
319. See FED. R. EvID. 1002.
320. See Helm v. State Election Bd., 589 P.2d 224, 234 (Okla. 1979).
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hearsay rule would not is that the two rules serve different purposes. 321 The
hearsay rule is concerned with the accuracy and honesty of the out-of-court
declarant and thus demands that the declarant appear at trial and testify
when her statement's relevance depends upon the jury crediting the truth of
the statement, but not when it is offered merely to prove the fact that the
statement was actually made.322 The hearsay rule is not, however,
concerned with the veracity of the in-court witness who recounts an out-of-
court statement made by an out-of-court declarant.323 However, the best
evidence rule is concerned with the veracity of such an in-court witness
testifying to the content of an out-of-court written statement, and thus
prefers that the writing itself be offered into evidence rather than secondary
evidence regarding its content.324
In the context of electoral evidence, the best evidence rule is thus
concerned with the possibility that either the voter herself or the third party
who observed her would not accurately recount the tenor of the vote cast,
and thus ordinarily would demand that the marked ballot itself be produced
into evidence to prove the tenor of the individual's vote. It would also be
concerned with the possibility that an official canvas of the ballots was not
accurate, and thus would demand resort to the ballots themselves.325 And
thus, court decisions generally hold that ordinarily the best evidence of how
a person voted is her marked ballot. 326
321. See Colin Miller, Contents May Have Shifted: Disentangling the Best Evidence Rule from
the Rule Against Hearsay, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 186, 194-98 (2014).
322. See Miller, supra note 321, at 188-92, 197-98.
323. See Miller, supra note 321.
324. See id. at 198 (noting that, in contrast to the hearsay rule, "the Best Evidence Rule is
concerned with the question of whether a statement was made").
325. When what is sought to be proven is not the vote of a specific individual but the overall
outcome of the election, there is a split on whether the best evidence of that is the ballots themselves,
see, e.g., Viel v. Summers, 209 P. 454, 456-57 (Idaho 1922); Spidle v. McCracken, 25 P. 897, 898
(Kan. 1891), or the official canvas of the same, see, e.g., Rhode v. Steinmetz, 55 P. 814, 817 (Colo.
1898); Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 607-08 (Ill. 1990). To some extent, the approach followed
depends on the philosophical question of what one means by the election result. See 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 1240, 1351, at 572, 836 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Even if the ballots are treated as the
best evidence, the official canvas should qualify as an admissible summary of the same. See FED. R.
EVID. 1006.
326. See Nat'l. Fed'n of Ry. Workers v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 110 F.2d 529, 536 (D.C. Cir.
1940); Pullen, 561 N.E.2d at 607-08; Laleman v. Bredesen, 36 N.E.2d 727, 728 (I11. 1941); Reynolds v.
State, 61 Ind. 392, 422-23 (1878); State ex rel. Beu v. Lockwood, 165 N.W. 330, 333 (Iowa 1917);
Hudson v. Solomon, 19 Kan. 177, 179-80 (1877); Rich v. Young, 197 S.W. 442, 444 (Ky. 1917);
Carabajal v. Lucero, 158 P. 1088, 1092-93 (N.M. 1916); Howser v. Pepper, 79 N.W. 1018, 1019 (N.D.
1899); Helm v. State Election Bd., 589 P.2d 224, 234 (Okla. 1979); Hartman v. Young, 20 P. 17, 19-20
(Or. 1888); Thoms v. Andersen, 244 N.W.2d 311, 311-12 (S.D. 1976); Owens v. State, 64 Tex. 500,
505 (1885); Savage v. Umphries, 118 S.W. 893, 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909). Case law describing the
best evidence rule sometimes uses the phrase "parol evidence" to refer to oral secondary evidence
normally prohibited by the best evidence rule. See, e.g., Midland Eng'g Co. v. John A. Hall Constr. Co.,
398 F. Supp. 981, 989 (N.D. Ind. 1975); Condren v. Gibbs, 127 S.W. 731, 733 (Ark. 1910); State v.
Bagemehl, 515 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Kan. 1973); State v. Curry, 473 S.W.2d 747, 748-49 (Mo. 1971);
State v. Anderson, 169 S.E.2d 38, 40 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969); Doss v. Chambers, 188 S.W. 260, 262 (Tex.
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In the case of a simple dispute over the tally of the ballots in a close
contest, the best evidence rule would simply require production of the
ballots themselves as contrasted with merely the official canvas or voter
testimony. Or, if there was a dispute over the intent of a handful of
ambiguously marked ballots, the best evidence rule would require that
resort be had solely to the contested ballots themselves.
327
However, things become more complicated when it becomes necessary
to prove the votes of specific voters. For example, suppose that only one
vote separates the candidates, and there are five individuals known to have
voted illegally. Alternatively, perhaps one would like to prove a person's
legal vote in an election regarding gay rights in a case in which she is
alleged to have acted with anti-gay animus. With the advent of the secret
ballot, there is no way in these or other comparable circumstances to
identify the "ballot itself' of the voter at issue. Moreover, there may be
circumstances in which resort to the ballots themselves makes no logical
sense, such as where there are allegations that the original ballots were
tampered with, or that the original ballots were lost, destroyed, or stolen.
Yet, as with the hearsay rule, there are exceptions to the best evidence
rule that would be applicable in such scenarios. For example, if the
originals are lost or destroyed (and not by the proponent of alternative
evidence acting in bad faith), or they cannot be obtained by any available
judicial process, then resort to secondary evidence-such as testimony
regarding the contents of the writing-is permissible. 328 These exceptions
have been deemed applicable in election contests in which the original
ballots have been lost, destroyed, or stolen,329 or when there is an allegation
that the originals have been tampered with, treating that as akin to
destruction.33 ° Similarly, when there is a need to identify the votes of
specific voters but no way to tie ballots to specific voters-such as when
one is trying to determine the votes cast by illegal voters-courts deem the
best evidence rule inapplicable since the original ballots are for all intents
App. 1916); Gutierrez v. State, 745 S.W.2d 529, 530 (Tex. App. 1988); CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2318, 2322 (1858).
327. See McCreery v. Bumsmier, 127 N.E. 171, 174 (Ill. 1920); Wimmer v. Eaton, 34 N.W. 170,
171 (Iowa 1887); Butler v. Town of Edgefield, 493 S.E.2d 838, 844 (S.C. 1997); Duncan v. Willis, 302
S.W.2d 627, 637 (Tex. 1957); State ex rel. Cremer v. Steinborn, 66 N.W. 798, 798 (Wis. 1896).
328. See FED. R. EVID. 1004(a), (b).
329. See Condren, 127 S.W. at 733; Merritt v. Hinton, 17 S.W. 270, 271 (Ark. 1891); Dixon v.
Orr, 4 S.W. 774, 776 (Ark. 1887); Laleman, 36 N.E.2d at 728-29; State ex rel. Figley v. Conser, 24
Ohio Cir. Dec. 270, 274-75 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1902); State ex rel. Schuetz v. Luy, 79 N.W. 776, 776-77
(Wis. 1899).
330. See McDonald v. Wood, 24 So. 86, 88 (Ala. 1898); Laleman, 36 N.E.2d at 728-29; Kreitz
v. Behrensmeyer, 17 N.E. 232, 243-44 (Ill. 1888); Pedigo v. Grimes, 13 N.E. 700, 704 (Ind. 1887);
Hudson, 19 Kan. at 180-81, 186; Dubie v. Batani, 37 P.2d 662, 668 (Mont. 1934); Howser, 79 N.W. at
1019; Thorns, 244 N.W.2d at 312-13; Savage, 118 S.W. at 903.
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and purposes unavailable.33' In these circumstances, the best evidence rule
recognizes that resort to secondary evidence is necessary to resolve such
cases.
332
In sum, just like the political vote privilege, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and the rule against hearsay, the best evidence rule will
block some electoral evidence, but its porosity will permit at least some
electoral evidence to be admitted.
4. Unfair Prejudice
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence and their state law counterparts,
evidence that has probative value and is not subject to exclusion on the
ground of privilege, hearsay, the best evidence rule, or any other
evidentiary basis for exclusion can nonetheless be excluded if the court
determines that "its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger
of... unfair prejudice." '333 Thus, when evidence has only slight probative
value, but there is the risk that the trier of fact might misuse or overweigh
it, the court has discretion to exclude the evidence on the ground of unfair
prejudice.
Under this evidentiary principle, exclusion of electoral evidence might
thus be called for when it is offered in cases in which its probative value is
tenuous, but its risk of being misused or overvalued is high. As shown in
Part II, the probative value of electoral evidence is far lower when it is
offered outside of electoral contests, such as when offered to show
discriminatory intent in a civil or criminal case or to impeach a witness or a
potential juror for bias against a party. Given the low probative value and
significant risk of being overvalued or misused by the trier of fact, courts
have discretion to exclude electoral evidence offered in these contexts
under Rule 403, and parties are very likely to invoke it in that context.
However, Rule 403 is written in general terms, and trial court judges
are given broad leeway in applying its balancing test. Their application of
Rule 403 is subject to review only for abuse of discretion, and such rulings
are rarely reversed on appellate review. 334 Thus, although it has the
potential to minimize the third risk associated with electoral evidence, it is
331. See Crabb v. Orth, 32 N.E. 711, 712 (Ind. 1892); Montgomery v. Dormer, 79 S.W. 913,
915-16 (Mo. 1904); Lane v. Bailey, 75 P. 191, 195 (Mont. 1904); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1192,
1291a, at 436, 506-07 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
332. See McDonald, 24 So. at 88; State ex rel. Beu v. Lockwood, 165 N.W. 330, 333 (Iowa
1917); Savage, 118 S.W. at 903.
333. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
334. See Old Chiefv. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note
297, at 4:12.
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not a consistently reliable method of assuring that such evidence will be
excluded.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Electoral evidence in its various forms is most relevant in election
contests and has lesser relevance in other types of substantive disputes or
when offered to prove the potential bias of a juror or a witness. Yet
electoral evidence carries with it a number of dangers, including
questionable trustworthiness, undermining of ballot secrecy, and the risk of
being overvalued or misused by the trier of fact.
Existing evidentiary principles address some of the dangers associated
with electoral evidence, but do so in a piecemeal fashion that only partially
addresses the dangers associated with electoral evidence. Together, the
political vote privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination serve as
the most significant barriers to admitting electoral evidence, providing the
potential for excluding testimony from nearly every voter-legal or
illegal-regarding the tenor of her vote. Yet, because both privileges put
the power to invoke or waive them in the hands of the individual voter-
witnesses-and in the case of the privilege against self-incrimination, in the
hands of the government through a grant of immunity-they permit
testimony containing all of the dangers associated with electoral evidence
to be admitted, even if one or more of the parties to the action oppose its
admission. Moreover, the privileges regulate only one type of electoral
evidence-cdirect testimony from the voter herself-and leave unregulated
other forms of electoral evidence, such as the voter's out-of-court oral or
written statements regarding the tenor of her vote, testimony of third
persons who witnessed an individual cast her vote, or other circumstantial
evidence of how she voted.
Three other evidentiary doctrines partially fill some of these gaps, but
leave gaps of their own. The rule against hearsay presumptively excludes a
voter's out-of-court oral, written, and nonverbal assertions regarding the
tenor of her vote. Yet the rule against hearsay contains numerous
exceptions, at least half a dozen of which provide a basis for admitting such
statements. The best evidence rule presumptively prefers the original
ballots themselves over testimony regarding the content of the same, but
like the rule against hearsay, it contains several exceptions that pave the
way for allowing such testimony in most circumstances in which electoral
evidence is in play. Finally, the rules of evidence give trial courts the
discretion to exclude evidence with low probative value when there is a
risk that it might be overvalued or misused by the trier of fact, a provision
that can be valuable outside of electoral contests when the probative value
of electoral evidence is low and the risk of misuse is high. However, that
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discretion is relatively unstructured and reviewed deferentially on appeal,
leading to inconsistent application across judges and over time.
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence and their state law
counterparts consist largely of general rules such as these to address every
category of evidence, they also acknowledge that discrete categories of
evidence, when offered for particular purposes, raise sufficient dangers and
implicate important social policy concerns so as to call for a categorical
rule excluding such evidence, when offered for those purposes. Thus, for
example, the Federal Rules of Evidence include rules excluding (subject to
specified exceptions) a variety of different categories of evidence,
including: character evidence; 335 evidence of subsequent remedial
measures; 336 evidence of compromise offers and negotiations; 337 offers to
pay medical and similar expenses; 338 evidence of pleas, plea discussions,
and related statements; 339 evidence of liability insurance;340 and evidence of
the victim's sexual behavior or predisposition in sex-offense cases. 34 1 At
the state level, a number of states also categorically exclude statements of
sympathy or benevolence. 342 As rules derivative of the general principle set
forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and its state law counterparts, these
specific rules are often justified on the ground that the evidence at issue is
almost always of low probative value relative to its risk of being
overvalued or misused.343 Yet each of these rules is also justified on the
ground that it furthers some broader social policy. Thus, excluding
evidence of subsequent remedial measures is justified by the "social policy
of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them from
taking, steps in furtherance of added safety."'3 44 Excluding evidence of
compromise offers and negotiations in civil cases and pleas, plea
discussions, and related statements in criminal cases furthers the public
policy favoring the disposition of civil and criminal cases by
compromise.345 Evidence of offers to pay medical and similar expenses are
excluded so as not to discourage those benevolent gestures from taking
335. See FED. R. EvID. 404.
336. See FED. R. EvID. 407.
337. See FED. R. EVID. 408.
338. See FED. R. EVtD. 409.
339. See FED. R. EvID. 410.
340. See FED. R. EviD. 411.
341. See FED. R. EviD. 412.
342. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160 (2001); TENN. R. EvID. 409.1.
343. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note; FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's
note; FED. R. EV1D. 408 advisory committee's note; FED. R. EvID. 409 advisory committee's note; FED.
R. EvID. 411 advisory committee's note.
344. See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note.
345. See FED. R. EviD. 408 advisory committee's note; FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee's
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place.346 Evidence of a victim's sexual behavior or predisposition is
excluded in sex-offense cases so as to encourage victims of such crimes to
come forward and report the crimes and testify against their attackers
without fear that the intimate details of their past sexual activities will be
divulged and explored in court.
3 4 7
Electoral evidence has much in common with the types of evidence
covered by these categorical rules of exclusion. Outside of electoral
contests, its probative value is typically low relative to its risk of being
overvalued or misused by the trier of fact. In all types of cases, admitting it
undermines the social policy of ballot secrecy, which in turn furthers the
interest in free exercise of the franchise. Moreover, electoral evidence has
the added danger of being unusually untrustworthy. While these concerns
are addressed to some extent by the existing rules of evidence, they contain
a number of gaps that still allow for the admission of electoral evidence
that raises one or more of these dangers. For these reasons, a categorical
rule generally excluding such evidence seems justified.
In drafting such a rule, policy makers would-in addition to stating the
general rule of exclusion-need to address two additional matters. First,
they would need to define with precision the phrase "electoral evidence" so
as to determine what comes within the scope of the rule. Second, they
would need to identify the exceptions to the general rule, if any.
At the very least, such a rule should define the phrase "electoral
evidence" to exclude any direct evidence of how someone voted in an
election. This would include the voter's own testimony regarding the tenor
of her vote, evidence of the voter's out-of-court written or oral statements
regarding the tenor of her vote, and testimony by those who claim to have
observed the person cast her vote. All three of these are tainted by risks of
untrustworthiness: the first by the voter's lack of trustworthiness, the third
by the third party's potential to distort, and the second by the lack of
trustworthiness of both the voter and the third party. Although the last type
of direct evidence is arguably more trustworthy since a third party has
directly observed it, admitting it significantly erodes the social policy
favoring ballot secrecy. Because of the many risks associated with direct
evidence of how a person cast her vote, such evidence should be excluded
without regard to the purpose for which the evidence is being offered.
Because of the inherent unreliability and other dangers associated with
such direct evidence, the rule should thus be modeled after Federal Rule of
Evidence 412-which provides for a blanket exclusion of evidence of a
victim's other sexual behavior or sexual predisposition, subject to finite
346. See FED. R. EviD. 409 advisory committee's note.
347. See FED. R. EVID. 412.
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exceptions 348 -and not the other categorical rules of exclusion, which only
exclude the evidence if it is offered for certain purposes but not others.349
Whether such a rule should also exclude circumstantial evidence of
how someone voted-such as her party registration, her contributions to
political parties and candidates, her signing of petitions to place a candidate
or an initiative on the ballot, and her statements of support for particular
candidates and ballot issues-is a closer question. In contrast to direct
evidence of how someone voted, admitting these categories of electoral
evidence does not undermine the interest in ballot secrecy. Indeed, three of
these acts-party registration to participate in a primary election,
contributions to candidates, and the signing of nominating petitions-are
typically legally required to be openly public acts performed on the part of
voters. Those same three acts are also more reliable proof of an individual's
likely vote. It is one thing to make a casual remark of support for or
opposition to a given candidate in a social setting, when one's statement
may be colored by an effort to fit in with a given social group. The decision
to register with a political party, to donate money to a candidate, or to sign
a nominating petition, on the other hand, involves making a known public
statement that is not likely to be undertaken casually by a voter. Moreover,
to the extent that a jurisdiction opts to resolve election contests by means of
the "direct evidence" method, excluding these types of evidence will make
it impossible to resolve such disputes in accordance with state law.
Objective circumstantial evidence-such as party registration,
campaign contributions, and signatures on nominating petitions-does not
pose nearly the same dangers as does direct electoral evidence. It is
objectively verifiable (and thus more trustworthy), and because it involves
acts legally required to be performed in a public fashion, admitting such
evidence does not undermine the right to a secret ballot. Moreover,
although it is true that they might, in some instances, result in erroneous
predictions of how a person voted or likely voted, when used in election
contests (as opposed to trying to prove the tenor of a specific person's vote
in other types of cases), the errors are likely to cancel one another out. In
other words, unless there is a reason to believe that registered Republicans
are more likely than registered Democrats to cast crossover votes (or vice
versa), it will still allow for the accurate resolution of election disputes. For
example, if an election contest between two candidates is divided by a
single vote, and there are five illegal votes cast by registered Democrats
and only one illegal vote cast by a registered Republican, it seems to be an
348. See id.
349. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407 (deeming evidence of subsequent remedial measures to be
inadmissible only when offered for certain purposes); FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (deeming evidence of a
crime, wrong, or act to be inadmissible when offered to prove a person's character, but not when
offered for other purposes).
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easy call to declare the Republican candidate the winner by resort to the
circumstantial evidence of party registration.
On the flip side, there are still some risks associated with admitting
even circumstantial evidence of how one voted in an election. First, some
categories of circumstantial evidence-such as general statements of
support for a particular candidate or ballot issues-raise the same dangers
of trustworthiness as direct statements by the voter regarding the tenor of
her vote. Second, the knowledge that one's political contributions, party
registrations, and signatures on nominating petitions could be admitted in
judicial proceedings might discourage some people from engaging in those
activities. Third, allowing only for the admission of circumstantial evidence
of how one voted may present the trier of fact with a distorted picture of
how a person likely voted. Based on his party registration alone, one would
infer that former president George H.W. Bush voted for Donald Trump in
the 2016 election, yet his public statements indicated otherwise.35° These
risks suggest that circumstantial electoral evidence should be admitted only
when absolutely necessary-such as when needed to resolve an election
contest-but they do not compel the conclusion that it should never be
admitted, or that it should only be admitted in conjunction with direct
electoral evidence.
As for exceptions to any such rule of exclusion, five possibilities stand
out as potentially required. First, to the extent a jurisdiction follows the
"direct evidence" approach to resolving disputed election contests, an
exception would be necessary to avoid having the rule make a de facto
change in substantive law. Second, the rule should be drafted so as to make
it possible for someone to introduce evidence required to prove a claim in a
case alleging discrimination on the basis of political affiliation. In such a
case, a person is required to prove that the plaintiff and the defendant have
opposing political affiliations, and that the defendant acted with bias based
on those differences. 351 There are certain types of evidence-such as party
registration and statements like "I hate Democrats"--which directly prove
the necessary elements of a political affiliation discrimination claim but
that in theory could be used to prove circumstantially how someone voted
in a particular election context. The rule should be drafted to make clear
that such evidence is not barred when offered in such discrimination cases.
Third, to the extent that the tenor of one's vote is an essential element of a
charge, claim, or defense, electoral evidence offered to prove that essential
350. Steph Solis, George H. W. Bush to Vote for Clinton, Reports Say, USA TODAY (Sept. 20,
2016, 12:57 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/09/20/george-hw-
bush-vote-clinton-reports-say/90723912/.
351. See supra notes 151-52.
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element should be admissible.352 This exception would likely be applicable
in one narrow but important instance: a criminal case in which a person
stands accused of bribing someone or being bribed to vote a particular
way.353 Fourth, to the extent that electoral evidence in any given case is
deemed by a court to be constitutionally required to prove the bias of a
potential juror or witness, it would override any exclusionary rule to the
contrary.354 Finally, the rule should make clear that the original ballots
themselves are never subject to exclusion by this rule even if a voter has
self-identified herself on the ballot, which is typically a basis for
invalidating a ballot 355 and which of course requires resort to the self-
identifying ballot itself.
Ideally, the need for the first exception will quickly diminish in the
United States through procedures designed to identify and sequester the
ballots of challenged voters. Such procedures have quickly spread
throughout the United States in the twenty-first century as a result of the
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA),356 which requires states to
provide voters whose credentials are challenged at the polling place and
who are unable to then prove their eligibility to vote to cast a "provisional
ballot. 3 57 Such provisional ballots are individually sequestered from other
cast ballots and are counted only if the voter's eligibility to vote is
subsequently established. 358 Such a procedure-particularly if coupled with
a requirement that voter credentials must be challenged at the time of
voting or the right to later challenge is waived-obviates the need for
testimony in election contests from legal and illegal voters alike in most
instances. Ensuring that there is a paper backup of votes cast-such as
through the use of voting machines with VVPAT technology---obviates the
352. Cf FED. R. EvID. 405(b) (creating an exception to the general rule prohibiting proof of
character by way of specific instances of conduct when character is an essential element of a charge,
claim, or defense).
353. See supra note 280. In contrast, this exception would not apply in the situation in which a
person is alleged to have murdered someone because the victim voted for a specific candidate or a
specific way on a ballot measure. Motive is not an essential element of the crime of murder, and one
could admit the general motive evidence that the defendant was angry at the victim for voting for a
particular candidate without introducing evidence of precisely who the victim voted for. Introducing
evidence of specifically who the victim voted for typically adds nothing in terms of relevance but
increases the risk that the jurors might misuse the information, say, by engaging in jury nullification
because they, too, are angered by who the victim voted for. In any event, at most what would be
relevant in such a case is who the defendant perceived the victim to have voted for and not who the
victim actually voted for, and the former could be admitted without running afoul of the proposed rule.
354. Cf FED. R. EviD. 412(b)(1)(C) (creating an exception for "evidence whose exclusion would
violate the defendant's constitutional rights").
355. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 49.98 (West 2013); LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:1316 (1987).
356. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 302, 116 Stat. 1706 (2002)
(codified at 52 U.S.C. § 21082 (2012)).
357. 52 U.S.C. § 2 1082(a) (2012).
358. See id
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need for voter testimony in most of the remaining types of election
contests: in the event of a machine malfunction, resort can be made to the
paper backup rather than voter testimony in an attempt to recreate the
results of the election.
Putting all of this together leads to the following proposed amendment
to the Federal Rules of Evidence and their state law counterparts:
Rule 416: Electoral Evidence
(a) Prohibited Uses. Testimony by a voter, by third persons who
observed the voter cast her vote, the voter's out-of-court
statements regarding the tenor of her vote, or any other direct or
circumstantial evidence of how a specific identified person cast
her vote in a political election conducted by secret ballot is not
admissible.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) Election contests. When required by law to resolve an
election contest, objectively verifiable circumstantial
evidence offered to prove how a person cast her vote-such
as party registration, contributions to specific candidates,
and signatures on nominating forms-is admissible.
(2) Political affiliation discrimination. Circumstantial
evidence that could be used to infer the tenor of a person's
vote in a specific election is not excluded by this rule if it is
offered for the purpose of proving discrimination on the
basis of political affiliation.
(3) Essential element. When the tenor of a person's vote is
an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, direct or
circumstantial evidence offered to prove the tenor of the
vote cast is admissible.
(4) Criminal cases. Electoral evidence, the exclusion of
which in a criminal proceeding would violate the
defendant's constitutional rights, is admissible.
(5) Original ballots. This rule does not require the
exclusion of the original ballots themselves, even if the
ballots contain self-identifying marks that could be used to
tie a ballot to a specific individual.
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Although to some degree duplicative of the political vote privilege and
the privilege against self-incrimination, such a rule should be seen as
supplementing, rather than replacing, those privileges. One virtue of a
categorical rule of exclusion is that-unlike with the privileges-the
parties, and not merely the voters themselves, are empowered to invoke it,
thus allowing the parties to block the admission of untrustworthy evidence
in proceedings in which they will most directly be impacted. The
privileges, however, should remain in place to empower a voter to protect
her individual right not to disclose the tenor of her vote in the situation in
which the parties to a proceeding may wish to force her to do so by
collectively failing to invoke the categorical rule of exclusion.
CONCLUSION
Electoral evidence is relevant and thus potentially admissible, not only
to resolve election contests, but also for a number of other substantive and
impeachment purposes. Yet electoral evidence in all of these contexts
introduces a number of dangers, including the risk of admitting
untrustworthy evidence, undermining the right to a secret ballot, and
admitting evidence that might be overvalued or misused by the trier of fact.
The Federal Rules of Evidence and their state law counterparts address
many of these dangers, but in a piecemeal and incomplete fashion that still
allows for the admission of some electoral evidence that possesses some or
all of these dangers.
Ideally, changing the way in which we run elections-including the
creation of a paper trail for all votes cast, a requirement that all challenges
to voter credentials be raised at the time of voting, and a system for
sequestering challenged votes-will obviate the need for electoral evidence
in election contests, in which such evidence is most relevant. Yet, because
such reforms have not occurred nationwide, 359 and because electoral
evidence is still potentially admissible in other types of cases,36 ° this Article
concludes that federal and state policy makers should enact a specific rule
that-subject to limited exceptions-categorically excludes electoral
evidence from judicial proceedings.
359. See supra notes 69, 356-358.
360. See supra Part I.C.2.
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